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A SPORTING CHANCE: BIEDIGER V. 
QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY AND WHAT 
CONSTITUTES A SPORT FOR PURPOSES OF 
TITLE IX 




At the 2012 Summer Olympics in London, women comprised over half the 
members of the United States Olympic team.1  Female athletes accounted for 
fifty-eight medals, which represented fifty-six percent of the United States’ total 
medal count of 104.2  These totals stand in stark contrast to the 1972 Summer 
Olympics in Munich, where American women won only twenty-two medals, 
representing twenty-three percent of the American total.3  What accounts for the 
remarkable growth in female athletic participation and success over this  
forty-year period?  The obvious answer is that this period coincides with the 
enactment of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.4 
“Title IX . . . is widely recognized as the source of [the] vast expansion of 
athletic opportunities for women in the nation’s schools and universities . . . .”5  
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1. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 771 (3d ed. 2013). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2016). 
5. Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 2010); see also  
McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The 
participation of girls and women in high school and college sports has increased dramatically since 
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In 1972, the year Title IX was enacted, only 30,000 women participated in  
collegiate varsity or recreational sports.6  By the 2011–2012 school year, 
195,657 women participated in intercollegiate athletics sponsored by the  
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).7 
Not only has Title IX “had a tremendous impact on women’s opportunities 
in intercollegiate athletics,” it has also “enabled women to reap the myriad  
benefits of participation in athletic programs.”8  Courts have long recognized 
the manifold benefits student-athletes derive from participating in sports: 
 
For college students, athletics offers [sic] an opportunity to  
exacuate [sic] leadership skills, learn teamwork, build  
self-confidence, and perfect self-discipline.  In addition, for 
many student-athletes, physical skills are a passport to college 
admissions and scholarships, allowing them to attend  
otherwise inaccessible schools.  These opportunities, and the 
lessons learned on the playing fields, are invaluable in  
attaining career and life successes in and out of professional 
sports.9 
 
Ironically, given its significant contributions to female athletic  
participation, Title IX itself does not specifically mention athletics.  Rather, the 
statute “require[s] the promulgation of regulations to achieve gender equity in 
educational opportunities.”10  The resulting regulations require schools to  
“provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes,” through  
“selection of sports and levels of competition [which] effectively  
accommodate the interests and [abilities] of members of both sexes[.]”11  Thus, 
whether a school complies with Title IX by offering equal athletic  
opportunities to women turns in large part on whether the sports offered  
effectively accommodate the interests of female students. 
                                                 
Title IX was enacted.”). 
6. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 772. 
7. Id. at 775.  Throughout the 1970s, women athletes competed at the intercollegiate level under the  
auspices of the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW).  Id. at 772.  “In 1980,  
however, the NCAA began offering national championships for women” and effectively absorbed the  
women’s athletics programs at its member institutions.  Id.  Following an unsuccessful antitrust suit 
against the NCAA, the AIAW disbanded.  Id. 
8. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 93–94 (D.D.C. 2003). 
9. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1993). 
10. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 773. 
11. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2016). 
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This, of course, begs the question of what exactly constitutes a sport for 
purposes of the Title IX analysis.  Surprisingly, there has been little guidance 
from either courts or those individuals and agencies responsible for  
enforcement of Title IX as to which athletic activities are considered sports for 
Title IX compliance purposes.12  This is not merely an idle academic exercise.  
As discussed in more detail later in the Article, adopting an overly-broad  
definition of “sport” runs the risk of “watering-down” women’s sports for  
purposes of Title IX compliance.13  In 2008, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) 
of the United States Department of Education (DOE) issued a policy letter that, 
for the first time, directly addressed the question of what will be  
considered a “sport” for purposes of Title IX compliance.14  Subsequently, in a 
series of decisions issued between 2010 and 2013 in the case of Biediger v. 
Quinnipiac University, the United States District Court for the District of  
Connecticut and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit  
became the first federal courts to consider the analysis set forth in the 2008 OCR 
Letter and to attempt to define “sport” within the context of Title IX.15 
Part II of this Article explores in some detail the historical background of 
Title IX.  Particular attention is paid to the level of deference given by courts to 
the regulations and various other pronouncements on the subject issued by the 
relevant government agencies and individuals tasked with enforcing Title IX.  
Part III analyzes the three Biediger decisions that directly address the  
issue of what constitutes a “sport” for purposes of Title IX.  Part IV discusses 
the implications of the Biediger decisions for future Title IX litigation.   
Finally, this Article concludes that the Biediger decisions represent an  
appropriate balancing of the relevant factors and provide an important bulwark 
against the temptation of schools to take short cuts toward Title IX compliance 
in these challenging economic times. 
 
                                                 
12. Ephraim Glatt, Defining “Sport” Under Title IX: Cheerleading, Biediger v. Quinnipiac  
University, and the Proper Scope of Agency Deference, 19 SPORTS L.J. 297, 298 (2012) (noting the 
long-running debate among lawyers and academics regarding this issue). 
13. Erin E. Buzuvis, The Feminist Case for the NCAA’s Recognition of Competitive Cheer as an  
Emerging Sport for Women, 52 B.C. L. REV. 439, 464 (2011). 
14. See Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, OFF. FOR 
CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/col-
league-20080917.pdf; see also Glatt, supra note 12, at 308. 
15. See generally Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012); Biediger v. Quinnipiac 
Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D. Conn. 2013); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. 
Conn. 2010).  The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut also issued another  
decision granting the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, an opinion beyond the scope of the present 
analysis.  See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277, 298 (D. Conn. 2009). 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Enactment of Title IX 
“Title IX was Congress’s response to significant concerns about  
discrimination against women in education.”16  The hearings leading up to the 
enactment of Title IX elicited over 1,200 pages of testimony, “documenting 
‘massive, persistent patterns of discrimination against women’ in colleges and 
universities.”17  Congress intended the statute to serve a dual purpose: “‘to avoid 
the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices,’ and ‘to provide 
individual citizens effective protection against those practices.’”18  Section 901 
of Title IX provides, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal  
financial assistance.”19 
Interestingly, given the topic with which Title IX has subsequently  
become most associated, the language of the statute itself makes no mention of 
athletics.  Rather, Title IX constitutes “a broad prohibition of gender-based  
discrimination in all programmatic aspects of educational institutions.”20   
Congress designed “[t]he statute [to] sketch[] wide policy lines, leaving the  
details to regulating agencies.”21  Moreover, because Congress adopted Title IX 
as a floor amendment, Title IX lacks the usual committee report and other  
secondary legislative materials, which led to confusion regarding the statute’s 
scope.22  Indeed, “[t]he issue of discrimination against women in athletics  
programs of schools was mentioned only briefly during the congressional  
debates leading up to Title IX’s enactment.”23  In light of the uncertainty over 
                                                 
16. Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1999). 
17. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)) (citing Education 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–318, §§ 901–05, 86 Stat. 373, 373-75 (1972)). 
18. Id. (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)). 
19. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2016).  The provision “is  
patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.”  Nat’l Wrestling Coaches 
Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 87 (citing Education Amendments § 901; N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 
U.S. 512, 514, 529 (1982); 118 Cong. Rec. 5802, 5803, 5807 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of 
Sen. Bayh)). 
20. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993). 
21. Id. at 893. 
22. Id.; Glatt, supra note 12, at 300. 
23. McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2004); 
see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893 (noting “there were apparently only two mentions of intercollegiate 
athletics during the congressional debate”). 
HEFFERAN ARTICLE  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:34 PM 
2016] A SPORTING CHANCE  587 
whether athletics fell within the scope of Title IX, “for the first few years after 
it was passed, no court applied Title IX to find discrimination in an  
educational athletic setting.”24 
B. The 1975 Regulations 
In 1974, Congress made it clear that Title IX encompassed athletics when 
it enacted section 844 of the Education Amendments of 1974 (known as the 
Javits Amendment), which provided that  
 
The Secretary of . . . H[ealth,] E[ducation, and] W[elfare] shall 
prepare and publish . . . proposed regulations  
implementing the provisions of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 relating to the prohibition of sex  
discrimination in federally assisted education programs which 
shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities 
reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular 
sports.25 
 
“On June 20, 1974, [the Department of] H[ealth,] E[ducation, and] 
W[elfare] (HEW) published its proposed regulations implementing Title IX,” 
which included provisions specifically “address[ing] [Title IX]’s application to 
athletic programs.”26  HEW followed the requisite notice and comment  
procedures and, “[a]fter considering over 9,700 comments, suggestions, and  
objections . . . published [its] final regulations implementing Title IX on June 4, 
1975.”27  President Ford signed the regulations on May 27, 1975, after which 
they were submitted to Congress for review pursuant to the General Education 
Provisions Act (GEPA).28  Congress subsequently held six days of hearings on 
the regulation and did not disapprove them within the forty-five days allowed 
                                                 
24. Glatt, supra note 12, at 300–01. 
25. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, A POLICY INTERPRETATION: TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS (1979) [hereinafter POLICY INTERPRETATION] (alteration in original) (emphasis added); 
see also Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 95 (4th Cir. 2011); McCormick, 370 
F.3d at 287; Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1994); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 88 (D.D.C. 2003); Glatt, supra note 12, at 301. 
26. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d at 95 (citing 39 Fed. Reg. 22,227, 22,236 (June 20, 1974)); 
see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287. 
27. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (W.D. Va. 2009); see also 
Equity in Athletics, 639 F.3d at 95; McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287. 
28. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25. 
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under GEPA; accordingly, the regulations became effective on July 21, 1975.29 
The regulation applying Title IX to the athletic programs of educational  
institutions receiving federal funding remains effective today and “is the only 
regulation that discusses the application of Title IX to athletics.”30  It states as 
follows: 
 
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from  
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated  
differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated 
against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or  
intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient 
shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.31 
 
While this language appears to mandate co-ed teams, the regulation also 
recognizes that schools may offer separate teams for each gender as long as 
“either the sport in which the team competes is a contact sport or the  
institution offers comparable teams in the sport to both genders.”32  However, 
regardless of whether or not a school offers gender-segregated teams, “[a]  
recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or  
intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both 
sexes.”33  The regulation goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of ten factors 
relevant to the determination of whether a school is providing equal athletic 
opportunities to members of both sexes: 
 
In determining whether equal opportunities are available the 
Director will consider, among other factors: 
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of  
competition effectively accommodate the interests and 
abilities of members of both sexes; 
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies; 
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time; 
(4) Travel and per diem allowance; 
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic  
                                                 
29. Id.; McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287; Equity in Athletics, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
30. Glatt, supra note 12, at 302; see also Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
31. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2016). 
32. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896 (1st Cir. 1993); see also § 106.41(b). 
33. § 106.41(c). 
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tutoring; 
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; 
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive  
facilities; 
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and  
services; 
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; 
(10) Publicity.34 
 
Title IX claims based on the failure of an institution to provide equal  
athletic opportunities to members of both sexes fall into two categories based 
on the factors listed in the regulation.  “Effective accommodation” claims  
derive from the first factor and concern “a school’s allocation of athletic  
participation opportunities to its female and male students.”35  “Equal  
treatment” claims, on the other hand, focus on the remaining factors, which have 
been interpreted to require “equivalence in the availability, quality and kinds of 
other athletic benefits and opportunities provided male and female athletes,”36 
and typically “allege sex-based differences in the schedules, equipment,  
coaching, and other factors affecting participants in athletics.”37  Regardless of 
whether a school provides equal athletic benefits to both sexes in the sports  
offered, the school may still be in violation of Title IX based  
solely on its failure to effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of 
student-athletes of both sexes under the first factor.38 
Courts have accorded the 1975 Regulations substantial deference.  Where 
Congress entrusted the administration of a statute to an executive agency and 
explicitly left a gap in the statute for the agency to fill, the United States  
Supreme Court has deemed this to be “an express delegation of authority to the 
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”39  
“Such . . . regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,  
                                                 
34. Id.; see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2012). 
35. McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 291 (2d Cir. 2004); 
see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 92. 
36. Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
37. Id. at 965; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 291.  Most appellate decisions in the Title IX context  
involve effective accommodation claims, as opposed to equal treatment claims.  Id. 
38. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 965; Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1994); Glatt, 
supra note 12, at 302. 
39. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
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capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”40  Courts have consistently 
found that Congress explicitly delegated to HEW (and, ultimately, DOE) the 
task of issuing “regulations containing ‘reasonable provisions considering the 
nature of particular sports’” “with respect to ‘intercollegiate athletic activities’” 
under Title IX.41  Moreover, the ensuing regulations were held to be “neither 
‘arbitrary . . . [n]or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”42  Therefore, the 1975 
Regulations have received “considerable deference.”43 
C. The 1979 Policy Interpretation 
Unfortunately, while the 1975 Regulations clarified whether Title IX  
applied to athletics, they “did little to clarify [many of the] issues arising from 
that application.”44  Over the next three years, HEW “received nearly 100  
complaints alleging discrimination in athletics against more than 50  
institutions of higher education.”45  In the course of investigating these  
complaints and attempting to answer questions from educational institutions, 
HEW decided it needed to further explain the regulations “so as to provide a 
framework within which the complaints can be resolved, and to provide  
institutions of higher education with additional guidance on the requirements 
for compliance with Title IX in intercollegiate athletic programs.”46 
                                                 
40. Id. at 844.  Indeed, the Supreme Court “ha[s] long recognized that considerable weight should 
be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to  
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
41. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270 (quoting Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 
484, 612 (1974)); see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 288; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st 
Cir. 1993); Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 675 (W.D. Va. 2009). 
42. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 
U.S. at 844). 
43. Id.; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 96 (D.D.C. 
2003); see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895 (“The degree of deference is particularly high in Title IX cases 
because Congress explicitly delegated to the agency the task of prescribing standards for athletic  
programs under Title IX.”); Glatt, supra note 12, at 312 (stating that the regulations “are awarded  
substantial deference under Chevron”); cf. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 92 (D. 
Conn. 2010) (finding the 1975 Regulations “a reasonable interpretation of Title IX promulgated by 
HEW (and, today, enforced by OCR) according to specific congressional delegation,” mandating  
“‘particularly high deference’ under . . . Chevron.”).  
44. Glatt, supra note 12, at 302. 
45. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 290 (quoting POLICY  
INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 n.7; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896; Glatt, supra note 
12, at 302. 
46. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 290 (Policy 
 Interpretation was proposed “to provide additional guidance to schools on the requirements of Title IX 
compliance”); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 n.7 (Policy Interpretation was promulgated to enable schools “to 
establish whether they were in compliance with Title IX”); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896 (Policy  
HEFFERAN ARTICLE  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:34 PM 
2016] A SPORTING CHANCE  591 
To that end, on December 11, 1978, HEW published a proposed Policy  
Interpretation of the intercollegiate athletic provisions of Title IX for public 
comment.47  In the months that followed, HEW received “[o]ver 700  
comments reflecting a broad range of opinion.”48  Agency staff also “visited 
eight universities in June and July, 1979, to see how the proposed policy and 
other suggested alternatives would apply in actual practice at individual  
campuses.”49  “The final Policy Interpretation[, published on December 11, 
1979,] reflects the many comments HEW received and the results of the  
individual campus visits.”50 
The Policy Interpretation “applies to any public or private  
institution . . . that operates an educational program or activity which receives 
or benefits from [federal] financial assistance,” including “educational  
institutions whose students participate in [federally] funded or guaranteed  
student loan or assistance programs.”51  Its stated goals are:  (1) to “clarif[y] the 
meaning of ‘equal opportunity’ in intercollegiate athletics,” as set forth in the 
1975 Regulations; (2) to “explain[] the factors and standards set out in the law 
and regulation” which will be considered in determining whether an  
institution’s intercollegiate athletics program is in compliance with the equal 
opportunity requirements of the regulations; and (3) to “provide[] guidance to 
assist institutions in determining whether any disparities which may exist  
between men’s and women’s programs are justifiable and nondiscriminatory.”52  
The Policy Interpretation sets forth the requirements necessary to achieve  
compliance within three major areas of Title IX: (1) athletic financial assistance 
(i.e., scholarships); (2) equivalence in other athletic benefits and opportunities 
(the factors laid out in 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)–(10)); and (3) effective  
accommodation of student interests and abilities (the factor laid out in 34 C.F.R. 
§ 106.41(c)(1)).53  A university is in violation of Title IX if it violates any one 
of these three major areas of investigation.54 
                                                 
Interpretation was implemented to “encourage self-policing and thereby winnow complaints”). 
47. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 
675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (W.D. Va. 2009). 
48. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25. 
49. Id.; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 664–65. 
50. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 290. 
51. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25. 
52. Id.; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 665; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 89 (D.D.C. 2003). 
53. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 
F. Supp. 2d at 89 n.3; POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25. 
54. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 89 n.3.  Thus, a school may be in violation 
of Title IX if it ineffectively accommodates students’ interests and abilities, even if it meets the athletic 
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As to the effective accommodation of student interests and abilities, “the 
governing principle in this area is that the athletic interests and abilities of male 
and female students must be equally effectively accommodated.”55  In assessing 
compliance with this area, the agency examines three factors: 
 
a. The determination of athletic interests and abilities of  
students; 
b. The selection of sports offered; and 
c. The levels of competition available including the  
opportunity for team competition.56 
 
Under the third factor—levels of competition—the Policy Interpretation 
states that “[i]n effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of male 
and female athletes, institutions must provide both the opportunity for  
individuals of each sex to participate in intercollegiate competition, and for  
athletes of each sex to have competitive team schedules which equally reflect 
their abilities.”57  Thus, compliance under this third factor is measured by  
reference to two separate benchmarks: “(1) equity in athletic opportunities; and 
(2) equity in competition.”58  Whether a university meets these obligations is 
determined under two distinct tests, both of which must be satisfied to  
comply with this component of Title IX’s mandate.59 
As to whether a university is providing equal opportunity for individuals of 
each sex to participate in intercollegiate competition, compliance is  
assessed in any of the following ways: 
 
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for 
                                                 
financial assistance and equivalence in other athletics benefits and opportunities prongs.  See Cohen, 
991 F.2d at 897.  “In other words, an institution that offers women a smaller number of athletic  
opportunities than the statute requires may not rectify that violation simply by lavishing more resources 
on those women or achieving equivalence in other respects.”  Id. 
55. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 291. 
56. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 
824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches 
Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25). 
57. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25 (emphasis added); see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 
300 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 
414, 437 (D. Conn. 2013) (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches 
Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25). 
58. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 437. 
59. Id. 
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male and female students are provided in numbers  
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or 
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are  
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the 
institution can show a history and continuing practice of  
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the  
developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or 
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among 
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a  
continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited 
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and 
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and  
effectively accommodated by the present program.60 
 
This is the famous (or infamous) “three-part test,” the application of which 
forms the crux of most Title IX litigation.61  “The test is applied to assess 
whether an institution is providing nondiscriminatory participation  
opportunities to individuals of both sexes . . . .”62  The three prongs of the test 
establish “safe harbors,” and a university is in compliance with Title IX as long 
as it meets any one of the three prongs.63 
As to the second benchmark—equity in competition—the Policy  
Interpretation sets forth a two-part “levels of competition” test.64  Compliance 
is assessed by examining the following: 
 
(1) Whether the competitive schedules for men’s and  
women’s teams, on a program-wide basis, afford  
                                                 
60. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 
92–93 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 96 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); 
Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting POLICY 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); McCormick, 370 F.3d at 300 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, 
supra note 25); Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828-29 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Cohen 
v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); 
Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 
25). 
61. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 300. 
62. Id. 
63. Id.; Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 965; Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 88 (D. 
Conn. 2010). 
64. See Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 437. 
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proportionally similar numbers of male and female athletes 
equivalently advanced competitive opportunities; or 
(2) Whether the institution can demonstrate a history and  
continuing practice of upgrading the competitive opportunities 
available to the historically disadvantaged sex as warranted by 
developing abilities among the athletes of that sex.65 
 
Informal agency rulings such as the Policy Interpretation, which are not  
arrived at after a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, are 
not entitled to Chevron-level deference.66  Still, as the Supreme Court  
acknowledged in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,67 such rulings “are made in  
pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and  
broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a 
particular case,” and are therefore “entitled to respect.”68  “[These] rulings,  
interpretations and opinions . . . while not controlling upon the courts by  
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed  
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”69   
Unlike the more lenient standard in Chevron, whether such pronouncements  
receive deference in a given case “will depend upon the thoroughness evident 
in [their] consideration, the validity of [their] reasoning, [their] consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give [them] power 
to persuade, if lacking power to control.”70 
However, some informal agency pronouncements lacking the force of law 
are still entitled to “substantial deference.”71  “Because applying an agency’s 
regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s 
unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives,” courts will “presume that the 
power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the 
agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”72  Accordingly, if the informal agency 
pronouncement is an interpretation of the agency’s own regulation, and the  
                                                 
65. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829 (quoting POLICY 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 439 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION,  
supra note 25). 
66. Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); see also Glatt, supra note 12, at 312–13. 
67. See generally 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
68. Id. at 139–40. 
69. Id. at 140. 
70. Id.; see also Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586–87; Glatt, supra note 12, at 313. 
71. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991) (quoting 
Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986)). 
72. Id. at 151. 
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language of the regulation is ambiguous, courts will give effect to the agency’s 
interpretation as long as it is “reasonable” and “sensibly conforms to the purpose 
and wording of the regulations.”73  Courts will, therefore, defer to the agency’s 
interpretation “unless that interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation[s] or there is any other reason to suspect that the  
interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the 
matter in question.’”74 
The Policy Interpretation, though an informal agency pronouncement, is  
accorded the substantial level of deference discussed above.  Courts have  
determined that “the regulatory language that the policy interpretation  
construes describes how an institution can provide ‘equal athletic opportunity 
for members of both sexes’ and ‘effectively accommodate the interests and  
abilities of members of both sexes.’”75  The applicable language from the 1975 
Regulations has been found to have been “written at a high level of abstraction 
and, as a result, is ambiguous,” as evidenced by “the high number of suits that 
arose immediately after the promulgation of the regulation[s].”76  Accordingly, 
the Policy Interpretation has been deemed “a reasonable and ‘considered  
interpretation of the regulation[s],’” which is entitled to “controlling  
deference.”77  Indeed, “every court that has confronted the issue has held that 
the 1979 Policy Interpretation constitutes a reasonable and considered  
interpretation of § [106].41, and thus, that it is entitled to deference.”78 
                                                 
73. Id. at 150–51 (quoting N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter Cty. Chapter of Izaak Walton League of 
Am., Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975)); Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588; see also Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. 
of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994). 
74. Mullins v. City of New York, 653 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (2011)); see also Chalenor v. Univ. of 
N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2002) (deferring to any reasonable construction by the agency, 
“even though its interpretation might ‘not be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other 
standards.’”) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991)); Equity in  
Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 675 (W.D. Va. 2009). 
75. Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1046–47 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2000)). 
76. Id. at 1047. 
77. Id. (citation omitted). 
78. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 675; see also, e.g., Mansourian v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Policy Interpretation is entitled 
to deference under Chevron and Martin); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (deferring “substantially” to the Policy Interpretation as  an “effectively legislative” agency 
interpretation of its own regulations, “pursuant to a statutory delegation”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 
F.2d 888, 896–97 (1st Cir. 1993) (according the Policy Interpretation “substantial deference” as a  
“considered interpretation of the regulation”); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 440 
(D. Conn. 2013) (“The Second Circuit has held that courts owe the 1979 Policy Interpretation . . . a 
high degree of deference.”); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 92 (D. Conn. 2010) 
(finding the Policy Interpretation subject to deference under either Chevron or Skidmore because “it is 
both persuasive and not unreasonable”) (citation omitted); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t 
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Shortly after publication of the Policy Interpretation in 1979, Congress  
enacted the Department of Education Organization Act of 1979, which divided 
HEW into two new agencies—the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) and DOE.79  The existing Title IX regulations promulgated by HEW 
were left with HHS, and DOE duplicated and re-codified them.80  However, all 
of HEW’s educational functions were transferred to DOE, and DOE became the 
principal locus of Title IX enforcement activity, treating the 1975 HEW  
Regulations as its own.81  Accordingly, courts have “treat[ed] DOE as the  
[administrative] agency charged with administering Title IX.”82 
D. Developments in the 1980s 
The regulatory regime contemplated by the 1975 Regulations and the  
Policy Interpretation hit a roadblock in 1984, when the United States Supreme 
Court held in Grove City College v. Bell83 that Title IX was  
“program-specific.”84  This meant that “only the particular program that  
received federal financial assistance could be regulated under Title IX, as  
opposed to the entire institution.”85  As the First Circuit observed, “[b]ecause 
few athletic departments are direct recipients of federal funds—most federal 
money for universities is channeled through financial aid offices or invested 
directly in research grants—Grove City cabined Title IX and placed virtually all 
collegiate athletic programs beyond its reach.”86 
                                                 
of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 96 (D.D.C. 2003) (according “considerable deference” to the Policy 
Interpretation “based on findings that it does not violate the statute or regulations, exceed the agency’s 
statutory authority, or offend constitutional principles of Equal Protection”); cf. Biediger v. Quinnipiac 
Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2012) (erroneously citing McCormick for the proposition that the 
Policy Interpretation is entitled to “high deference” under Chevron, when McCormick refrained from 
determining which level of deference to apply to the Policy Interpretation). 
79. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 91; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t 
of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 96 (4th Cir. 2011); McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 
370 F.3d 275, 287 (2d Cir. 2004); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895. 
80. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. 
Supp. 2d at 91–92. 
81. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d at 96; McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287, 290; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 
895; Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 676. 
82. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 96 n.4; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287 (quoting Biediger, 691 F.3d 
at 96 n.4); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895. 
83. See generally 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
84. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894; Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 
at 665. 
85. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 665; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287; Cohen, 
991 F.2d at 894. 
86. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894. 
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In response to Grove City, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Restoration 
Act of 1987.87  The Civil Rights Restoration Act reinstated the institution-wide 
application of Title IX and requires that if any part of an educational  
institution receives federal funds, then the institution as a whole must comply 
with Title IX.88  While the Civil Rights Restoration Act does not specifically 
reference athletics, “the record of the floor debate leaves little doubt that the 
enactment was aimed, in part, at creating a more level playing field for female 
athletes.”89  As a result, courts consider it “crystal clear that Title IX applies to 
athletic programs operated by any school receiving federal funding for any of 
its educational programs and activities, and not just to those athletic programs 
which directly receive[] federal dollars.”90 
E. Letters of Clarification 
Since the 1980s, OCR, the sub-agency of DOE tasked with enforcing Title 
IX, has issued several letters of clarification relating to the three-prong test, as 
well as a letter addressing which activities constitute a sport for Title IX  
purposes.91 
 1.The 1996 Clarification 
Recognizing “the need to provide additional clarification regarding what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘three-part test,’ [and] to respond to requests for 
specific guidance about the existing standards that have guided the  
enforcement of Title IX in the area of intercollegiate athletics,” on September 
20, 1995, OCR circulated a draft of a proposed policy clarification to over 4,500 
interested parties, “soliciting comments about whether the document provided 
sufficient clarity to assist institutions in their efforts to comply with Title IX.”92  
                                                 
87. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2016). 
88. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894; Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 
at 666. 
89. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894. 
90. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 666 (quoting Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
91. Rachel Schwarz, Note, Timeout! Getting Back to What Title IX Intended and Encouraging 
Courts and the Office of Civil Rights to Re-Evaluate the Three-Prong Compliance Test, 20 WASH. & 
LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 633, 646 (2014); see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 
414, 440 (D. Conn. 2013). 
92. Norma V. Cantú, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, OFF. FOR CIV. 
RTS., U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Jan. 16, 1996), http://www2.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clar-
ific.html; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 666; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 
F. Supp. 2d at 92. 
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DOE also published a notice in the Federal Register announcing the availability 
of the draft clarification.93  After receiving comments from over 200 individuals 
as to whether the proposed clarification provided the appropriate level of clarity, 
on January 16, 1996, DOE released the final version of the policy clarification.94 
The final version of the policy clarification “provides specific factors that 
guide an analysis of each part of the three-part test . . . [and] provides examples 
to demonstrate, in concrete terms, how these factors will be considered.”95  In 
particular, the 1996 Clarification emphasizes that 
 
[T]he three-part test furnishes an institution with three  
individual avenues to choose from when determining how it 
will provide individuals of each sex with nondiscriminatory  
opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics.  If an  
institution has met any part of the three-part test, OCR will  
determine that the institution is meeting this requirement.96 
 
As to the first prong of the three-part test—substantial  
proportionality—the 1996 Clarification states that “where an institution  
provides intercollegiate level athletic participation opportunities for male and 
female students in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective  
full-time undergraduate enrollments, OCR will find that the institution is 
providing nondiscriminatory participation opportunities for individuals of both 
sexes.”97  The first step in this analysis entails “a determination of the number 
of participation opportunities afforded to male and female athletes in the  
intercollegiate athletic program.”98  This, in turn, begs the question of who  
exactly may be counted as a “participant” for purposes of this analysis. 
                                                 
93. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 666. 
94. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 92; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. 
Supp. 2d at 666; Cantú, supra note 92. 
95. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 666; Nat’l Wrestling 
Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 92–93 (quoting Cantú, supra note 92). 
96. Cantú, supra note 92 (noting “that an institution can choose which part of the test it plans to 
meet,” and it “need . . . comply only with any one part of the three-part test in order to provide  
nondiscriminatory participation opportunities for individuals of both sexes.”); see also Equity in  
Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 97 (4th Cir. 2011); Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 
2d at 666; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (quoting Cantú, supra note 92). 
97. Cantú, supra note 92 (noting that the substantial proportionality prong “focuses on the  
participation rates of men and women at an institution and affords an institution a ‘safe harbor’ for 
establishing that it provides nondiscriminatory participation opportunities.”). 
98. Id. (emphasizing that the clarification “further clarifies how Title IX requires OCR to count  
participation opportunities”); see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2012);  
Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 88 (D. Conn. 2010). 
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The Policy Interpretation defines participants as those athletes: 
 
a. Who are receiving the institutionally-sponsored support  
normally provided to athletes competing at the institution  
involved, e.g., coaching, equipment, medical and training room 
services, on a regular basis during a sport’s season; and 
b. Who are participating in organized practice sessions and 
other team meetings and activities on a regular basis during a 
sport’s season; and 
c. Who are listed on the eligibility or squad lists maintained for 
each sport; or 
d. Who, because of injury, cannot meet a, b, or c above but  
continue to receive financial aid on the basis of athletic  
ability.99 
 
The 1996 Clarification reiterates that the definition of “participant” is quite 
broad indeed.  A “participant” does not need “to meet minimum criteria of  
playing time or athletic ability.”100  The definition includes not only  
scholarship athletes receiving playing time, but “those athletes who do not  
receive scholarships (e.g., walk-ons), those athletes who compete on teams 
sponsored by the institution even though the team may be required to raise some 
or all of its operating funds, and those athletes who practice but may not  
compete.”101  In general, “all athletes who are listed on a team’s squad or  
eligibility list and are on the team as of the team’s first competitive event are 
counted as participants by OCR.”102  Student-athletes who participate in more 
than one sport may be counted as a participant in each sport in which they  
participate.103  Notwithstanding this broad definition of “participant,”  
                                                 
99. Cantú, supra note 92 (quoting language from the Policy Interpretation as the “definition of  
participant to determine the number of participation opportunities provided by an institution for  
purposes of the three-part test.”). 
100. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93; see also Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (quoting Biediger, 691 F.3d 
at 93); Cantú, supra note 92. 
101. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (quoting Cantú, supra note 92).  
This is because OCR determined “that these athletes receive numerous benefits and services, such as 
training and practice time, coaching, tutoring services, locker room facilities, and equipment, as well 
as important non-tangible benefits derived from being a member of an intercollegiate athletic team.”  
Cantú, supra note 92. 
102. Cantú, supra note 92; accord Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93. 
103. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93; Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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however, OCR cautions that only “actual” athletes may be counted, “because 
participation opportunities must be real, not illusory.”104  This means that the 
student-athlete must be “offer[ed] the same benefits as would be provided to 
other bona fide athletes.”105 
Unfortunately, while OCR devoted much of its attention in the 1996  
Clarification to which student-athletes may be counted as participants under the 
substantial proportionality prong, it neglected to devote the same coverage to 
the related issue of which activities qualify as participation opportunities.  The 
only insight on this topic offered in the 1996 Clarification is the brief statement 
that “the requirement to provide nondiscriminatory participation  
opportunities is only one of many factors that OCR examines to determine if an 
institution is in compliance with the athletics provision of Title IX.”106  “OCR 
also considers the quality of competition offered to members of both sexes in 
order to determine whether an institution effectively accommodates the interests 
and abilities of its students.”107 
Once all male and female participants are counted, the second step in the 
analysis is to determine whether athletic opportunities at the institution are  
substantially proportionate to the percentages of male and female  
undergraduate enrollment at the institution.108  The 1996 Clarification makes 
clear that substantial proportionality does not mean exact proportionality.109  
“Because this determination depends on the institution’s specific  
circumstances and the size of its athletic program, OCR makes this  
determination on a case-by-case basis, rather than . . . us[ing] . . . a statistical 
test.”110  OCR further clarified that it would  
 
consider [participation] opportunities . . . substantially  
                                                 
104. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 965–66 (defining participants as “the 
number of . . . athletes who actually participate in varsity athletics”); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 93 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing 1996 Clarification as “making it 
clear that the number of actual athletes on a team, as opposed to the number of slots available on a team, 
is used”). 
105. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93; Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89. 
106. Cantú, supra note 92. 
107. Id. (emphasis added); see also Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 93. 
108. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 440 (D. Conn. 
2013); Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89; Cantú, supra note 92. 
109. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993)  
(holding “that, while Title IX prohibits discrimination, it does not mandate strict numerical equality 
between the gender balance of a college’s athletic program and the gender balance of its student body.”). 
110. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 440; 
Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89. 
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proportionate when the number of opportunities that would be 
required to achieve proportionality would not be sufficient to 
sustain a viable team, i.e., a team for which there is a sufficient 
number of interested and able students and enough available 
competition to sustain an intercollegiate team.111 
 
  Consistent with the 1996 Clarification statement that exact  
proportionality is not required, no case to date has found “a disparity of two 
percentage points or less . . . to manifest a lack of substantial  
proportionality.”112 
OCR also used its explanation of substantial proportionality in the 1996 
Clarification to respond to critics who claimed that Title IX established an  
impermissible quota system.  The statute itself states that Title IX shall not  
 
be interpreted to require any educational institution to grant 
preferential or disparate treatment to the members of one sex 
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the 
total number or percentage of persons of that sex  
participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally  
supported program or activity, in comparison with the total 
number or percentage of persons of that sex in any  
community, State, section, or other area.113 
 
In essence, this means that “a court assessing Title IX compliance may not 
find a violation solely because there is a disparity between the gender  
composition of an educational institution’s student constituency, on the one 
hand, and its athletic programs, on the other hand.”114  This does not, however, 
preclude consideration of such statistical disparities.115  Pursuant to a proviso 
also found in Title IX, “a Title IX plaintiff in an athletic discrimination suit must 
accompany statistical evidence of disparate impact with some further  
                                                 
111. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 440; 
Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89.  “So, for example, if a school has five fewer female athletes than needed 
to reach exact proportionality, OCR would find the athletic program to be substantially proportional 
because no varsity team can be sustained with so few participants.”  Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89. 
112. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 106; see also Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 111. 
113. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2016); see also Cohen, 
991 F.2d at 894 (quoting § 1681(b)); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. 
Supp. 2d 82, 87 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting § 1681(b)). 
114. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895. 
115. Id.; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 
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evidence of discrimination, such as unmet need amongst the members of the 
disadvantaged gender.”116 
OCR further elaborated on these principles in the Cantú Letter  
accompanying the 1996 Clarification.  The Cantú Letter reiterated that  
“underrepresentation alone is not the measure of discrimination [and]  
[s]ubstantial proportionality merely provides institutions with a safe harbor.”117  
Thus, “OCR does not require quotas.”118  Substantial proportionality is only one 
of three alternative measures, meaning that “[a]n institution that does not  
provide substantially proportional participation opportunities for men and 
women may comply with Title IX by satisfying either part two or part three of 
the test.”119 
Finally, recognizing that “institutions face challenges in providing  
nondiscriminatory participation opportunities for their students,” OCR  
emphasized that “[t]he three-part test gives institutions flexibility and control 
over their athletics programs.”120  Such flexibility is indicative of “a society that 
cherishes academic freedom” and a judicial system that “recognizes that  
universities deserve great leeway in their operations.”121   
                                                 
116. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895; see also Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 87–88 
(quoting § 1681); cf. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 268, 270 (7th Cir. 1994) (“In 
essence the policy interpretation establishes a presumption that ‘effective accommodation’ has been 
achieved if males and females at a school participate in intercollegiate sports in numbers  
substantially proportionate to the number of students of each sex enrolled at the institution . . . . [I]f the 
percentage of student-athletes of a particular sex is substantially proportionate to the percentage of 
students of that sex in the general student population, the athletic interests of that sex are presumed to 
have been accommodated.”). 
117. Cantú, supra note 92. 
118. Id. 
119. Id.  “For example, if an institution chooses to and does comply with part three of the test, OCR 
will not require it to provide substantially proportionate participation opportunities to, or demonstrate 
a history and continuing practice of program expansion that is responsive to the developing interests 
of, the underrepresented sex.”  Id. 
120. Id. (“Ultimately, Title IX provides institutions with flexibility and choice regarding how they 
will provide nondiscriminatory participation opportunities.”); see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 
691 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2012); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 89 (D. Conn. 2010). 
121. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906.  Judicial reticence to interfere in the operations of higher education 
likely also explains the tendency of courts, even when finding a Title IX violation, to require the  
university in question to propose a compliance plan in the first instance rather than simply mandating 
the creation or deletion of particular teams.  Id.  Congress itself has expressed a preference for voluntary 
compliance with Title IX.  Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 88 n.2 (citing Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2016)).  Consistent with such preference, the 
“DoE ‘has not terminated its funding for any postsecondary institution for violation of [T]itle IX,’ but 
rather has secured compliance through ‘complaint investigations, compliance reviews, and the issuance 
of policy guidance.’ . . . The agency’s ‘approach to enforcement emphasizes collaboration and  
negotiation.’”  Id. (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GENDER EQUITY: MEN’S AND 
WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 5 (2000)) (internal citation omitted).  
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[S]trict numerical formulas or ‘cookie cutter’ answers to the  
issues that are inherently case- and fact-specific . . . not only 
would belie the meaning of Title IX, but would at the same time 
deprive institutions of the flexibility to which they are entitled 
when deciding how best to comply with the law.122 
 
Accordingly, rather than “pour[ing] ever-increasing sums into its athletic  
establishment,” an institution may also comply with the substantial  
proportionality prong “by subtraction and downgrading, that is, by reducing  
opportunities for the overrepresented gender while keeping opportunities  
stable for the underrepresented gender (or reducing them to a much lesser  
extent).”123  Schools, therefore, “can choose to eliminate or cap teams as a way 
of complying with part one of the three-part test.”124  At the same time,  
however, “nothing in the three-part test requires an institution to eliminate  
participation opportunities for men.”125 
Finally, courts accord the 1996 Clarification “substantial deference,”  
                                                 
 
Although the district court has the power to order specific relief if the institution 
wishes to continue receiving federal funds . . . the many routes to Title IX compliance 
make specific relief most useful in situations where the institution, after a judicial 
determination of noncompliance, demonstrates an unwillingness or inability to  
exercise its discretion in a way that brings it into compliance with Title IX.  
 
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906–07 (internal citation omitted); see also Glatt, supra note 12, at 302  
(“Although the OCR has the authority to revoke federal funding from violating schools, it has never 
taken such action.  Rather, the OCR usually works with universities to help ensure compliance.”)  
(citation omitted) (citing Greg Garber, Three-Pronged Test Makes True Compliance Vague, ESPN, 
http://espn.go.com/gen/womenandsports/020619enforce.html (last updated June 19, 2012)). 
122. Cantú, supra note 92. 
123. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 n.15. 
124. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89; cf. 
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 905. 
 
In an era where the practices of higher education must adjust to stunted revenues,  
careening costs, and changing demographics, colleges might well be obliged to curb 
spending on programs, like athletics, that do not lie at the epicenter of their  
institutional mission.  Title IX does not purport to override financial necessity.   
 
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 905. Indeed, “Title IX does not require institutions to fund any particular number 
or type of athletic opportunities—only that they provide those opportunities in a nondiscriminatory 
fashion if they wish to receive federal funds.”  Id. at 906. 
125. Cantú, supra note 92. 
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because it “reflect[s] reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguities in its own 
regulation, and there is no reason to think that the agency’s interpretations do 
not reflect its ‘fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.’”126 
2. The April 11, 2000 Letter 
Although the 1996 Clarification provided great detail about which  
student-athletes count as “participants” for purposes of the substantial  
proportionality prong, neither it nor any of the agency promulgations that  
preceded it provided much guidance as to which athletic activities count  
toward determining the male and female participation opportunities at a given 
institution.127  In other words, what exactly constitutes a “sport” for purposes of 
Title IX?  Even after the 1996 Clarification, “no procedure or formula  
existed for a university to determine which sports teams counted toward the 
‘substantial proportionality’ requirement.”128  In 2000, OCR issued a letter in 
response to a request by the Minnesota State High School League that  
discussed “the agency’s standards for distinguishing [a] ‘sport[]’ from [an]  
‘extracurricular activit[y]’ for purposes of Title IX [compliance].”129 
In this April 11, 2000 Letter, OCR recognized, “As part of its  
responsibility for enforcing the Title IX provisions regarding athletic  
programs, [it] must determine” which activities are part of an institution’s  
athletic program.130  However, “OCR does not rely on a specific definition of a 
sport.”131  Rather, OCR makes a case-by-case determination based, in part, 
                                                 
126. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 97 (quoting Mullins v. City of New York, 653 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d 
Cir.2011)); see also Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010)  
(noting that the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have held that the 1996 Clarification is entitled to  
deference under Chevron and Martin); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 445 (D. 
Conn. 2013) (stating the 1996 Clarification is entitled to “substantial deference”); Biediger, 728 F. 
Supp. 2d at 92 (observing that circuit courts have deemed the 1996 Clarification is “deserving of  
deference”). 
127. See Glatt, supra note 12, at 304 (finding that “the 1979 Policy Interpretation largely ignored 
the meaning of the word ‘athletic.’”). 
128. Id. 
129. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea, Nat’l Coordinator for Title IX Athletics, Office for Civil 
Rights, to David V. Stead, Exec. Dir., Minn. State High Sch. League (Apr. 11, 2000) (on file with the  
United States Department of Education); see also Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 444; Biediger, 728 F. 
Supp. 2d at 91. 
130. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 129. 
131. Id.  While OCR does not rely on a specific definition of “sport,” other jurisdictions have  
undertaken such an endeavor.  For instance, the California Education Code defines “extracurricular 
activity”  
as a program that has all of the following characteristics: 
(A) The program is supervised or financed by the school district. 
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on the purpose of the activity, the specification of seasons and competitions, and 
the adoption of official rules and personnel requirements.132  The determination 
of what constitutes a sport for purposes of Title IX would also take into  
consideration factors identified by athletic organizations or associations to  
differentiate between support activity and a sport.133 
OCR then enumerated the types of inquiries it would make and the process 
it would follow in assessing whether an activity constitutes a sport.134   
 
In determining whether an activity is a sport OCR will  
consider . . . 
 
 whether selection for the team is based upon objective 
factors related primarily to athletic ability;  
. . . 
 whether the team prepares for and engages in  
competition in the same way as other teams in the  
athletic program with respect to coaching,  
recruitment, budget, try outs and eligibility, and length 
and number of practice sessions and  
competitive opportunities;  
                                                 
(B) Pupils participating in the program represent the school district. 
(C) Pupils exercise some degree of freedom in either the selection, planning, or  
control of the program. 
(D) The program includes both preparation for performance and performance  
before an audience or spectators. 
 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160.5(a)(1) (2016).  The California Education Code further defines 
“[i]nterscholastic athletics . . . as ‘those policies, programs, and activities that are formulated or  
executed in conjunction with, or in contemplation of, athletic contests between two or more schools, 
either public or private.’”  Id. § 35179(f). 
132. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 129.  OCR made clear 
that it does not “rely solely on a claim by the institution that the activity is part of the athletic program.”  
Id. 
133. Id.  OCR’s definition of “sport” is similar to the NCAA’s definition, which states  “[A] sport 
shall be defined as an institutional activity involving physical exertion with the purpose of  
competition . . . within a defined competitive season(s) . . . and standardized rules with rating/scoring 
systems ratified by official regulatory agencies and governing bodies.”  CRITERIA FOR EMERGING 
SPORTS, NCAA.ORG, (n.d.), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Criteria+for+Emerg-
ing+Sports.pdf. 
134. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 129.  
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 whether the activity is administered by the athletic de-
partment; and 
. . . 
 whether state, national, and conference  
championships exist for the activity135 
 
If, after analysis of these factors, it is evident that the purpose of the team is 
primarily to support and promote other athletes, then the team will not be  
considered to be engaged in a sport.136   
OCR further provided that it would also consider the following  
non-exhaustive list of “other evidence relevant to the activity, which might 
demonstrate that it is part of an institution’s athletic program”: 
 
 “whether the activity is recognized as part of the  
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletic program by 
the athletic conference to which the institution  
belongs and by organized state and national  
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletic associations;” 
 whether organizations knowledgeable about the  
activity agree that it should be recognized as an  
athletic sport; 
 whether there is a specified season for the activity 
which has a recognized commencement and ends in a 
championship; 
 whether there are specified regulations for the activity 
governing the activity such as coaching, recruitment, 
eligibility, and the length and number of practice  
sessions and competitive opportunities; 
 “whether a state, national,  or conference rule book or 
manual has been adopted for the activity;” 
 “whether there is state, national, or conference  
regulation of competition officials along with  
standardized criteria upon which the competition may 
be judged; and, 
                                                 
135. Id.  
136. See id. 
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 whether participants in the activity/sport are eligible to 
receive scholarships and athletics awards (e.g.,  
varsity awards).”137 
3. The September 17, 2008 Letter 
Following the April 11, 2000 Letter, it would be another eight years before 
OCR issued a further pronouncement regarding what constitutes a “sport” for 
purposes of Title IX.138  “In September 2008, Stephanie Monroe, the Assistant 
Secretary for Civil Rights for the OCR, wrote an official letter” addressed to all 
universities through a generic “Dear Colleague” format.139  The Letter’s stated 
purpose was to “provide[] clarifying information to help institutions  
determine which intercollegiate or interscholastic athletic activities can be 
counted for the purpose of Title IX compliance.”140  It reiterated that in  
determining whether an institution provides equal athletic opportunities in  
compliance with Title IX, the opportunities provided must take place within the 
context of an intercollegiate or interscholastic sport.141  However, “OCR does 
not have a specific definition of the term ‘sport.’”142  Rather, “OCR  
considers several factors related to an activity’s structure, administration, team 
preparation and competition . . . when determining whether an activity is a sport 
that can be counted as part of an institution’s intercollegiate or  
interscholastic athletics program for the purpose of determining compliance 
with 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).”143  The Letter proceeded to describe these factors 
                                                 
137. Id. 
138. In the meantime, the “DOE issued an Additional Clarification [in 2005], emphasizing that 
institutions could demonstrate compliance under any prong of the Three-Part Test.”  Equity in Athletics, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 97 (4th Cir. 2011). 
139. Glatt, supra note 12, at 305. 
140. Monroe, supra note 14, at 1. 
141. Id.; see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating “that a 
genuine athletic participation opportunity must take place in the context of a ‘sport.’”); Biediger v. 
Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 442 (D. Conn. 2013) (describing the 2008 Letter as  
“explain[ing] that, for an athletic activity to be counted in the substantial-proportionality analysis, the 
activity must take place in the context of an authentic varsity ‘sport.’”); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 
728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 89 (D. Conn. 2010) (noting that pursuant to the 2008 Letter, “for an athletic  
participation opportunity to be counted in the substantial proportionality analysis, that participation 
opportunity must take place in the context of an intercollegiate varsity ‘sport.’”). 
142. Monroe, supra note 14, at 1; see also Glatt, supra note 12, at 305; Jacqueline R. Liguori, Case 
Note, Sticking the Landing: How the Second Circuit’s Decision in Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ. Can 
Help Competitive Cheerleading Achieve “Sport” Status Under Title IX, 21 JEFFREY S. MOORAD 
SPORTS L.J. 153, 162 (2014). 
143. Monroe, supra note 14, at 1–2; see also Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (quoting Monroe, 
supra note 14, at 2). 
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in greater detail. 
As an initial matter, if the institution is a member of an athletic  
organization, such as the NCAA or a state high school athletic association, as 
long as the requirements of such organization satisfy the factors set forth in the 
Letter and compliance is not discretionary, “OCR will presume that such an 
institution’s established sports can be counted under Title IX.”144  However, 
“[t]his presumption can be rebutted by evidence demonstrating that the  
institution is not offering the activity in a manner that satisfies the factors  
below.”145  In those situations where the presumption does not apply or has been 
rebutted, “OCR will evaluate an institution’s activit[ies] on a  
case-by-case basis [and] consider the factors below to make an overall  
determination of whether the activity can be considered part of the institution’s 
intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics program for the purpose of Title IX 
compliance.”146  These factors are grouped under two main prongs:  
(1) program structure and administration, and (2) team preparation and  
competition.147 
As to program structure and administration, OCR “tak[es] into account the 
unique aspects inherent in the nature and basic operation of specific sports, [and] 
considers whether the activity is structured and administered in a manner  
consistent with established intercollegiate or interscholastic varsity sports in the 
institution’s athletics program.”148  Specifically, OCR evaluates the  
following components: 
 
A. Whether the operating budget, support services (including 
academic, sports medicine and strength and conditioning  
support) and coaching staff are administered by the athletics 
department or another entity, and are provided in a manner  
consistent with established varsity sports; and 
B. Whether the participants in the activity are eligible to  
receive athletic scholarships and athletic awards (e.g., varsity 
                                                 
144. Monroe, supra note 14, at 2; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93–94; Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d 
at 442; Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89–90 (quoting Monroe, supra note 14, at 2); Glatt, supra note 12, 
at 305. 
145. Monroe, supra note 14, at 2. 
146. Id.; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 442 (noting that OCR will  
consider “a multitude of factors” bearing on whether an activity constitutes a sport); Biediger, 728 F. 
Supp. 2d at 90 (describing “a bevy of factors” to be considered by OCR in determining whether an 
activity amounts to a sport); Glatt, supra note 12, at 305. 
147. Monroe, supra note 14, at 2–4. 
148. Id. at 2. 
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awards) if available to athletes in established varsity sports; to 
the extent that an institution recruits participants in its  
athletics program, whether participants in the activity are  
recruited in a manner consistent with established varsity 
sports.149 
 
In terms of team preparation and competition, OCR “tak[es] into account 
the unique aspects inherent in the nature and basic operation of specific sports, 
[and] considers whether the team prepares for and engages in competition in a 
manner consistent with established varsity sports in the institution’s  
intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics program.”150  Specifically, OCR  
evaluates all of the following factors: 
 
A. Whether the practice opportunities (e.g., number, length and 
quality) are available in a manner consistent with  
established varsity sports in the institution’s athletics program; 
and 
B. Whether the regular season competitive opportunities differ 
quantitatively and/or qualitatively from established varsity 
sports; whether the team competes against intercollegiate or  
interscholastic varsity opponents in a manner consistent with 
established varsity sports; 
 
When analyzing this factor, the following may be taken into 
consideration: 
 
1. Whether the number of competitions and length of play 
are predetermined by a governing athletics organization, an 
athletic conference, or a consortium of institutions; 
2. Whether the competitive schedule reflects the abilities of 
the team; and 
3. Whether the activity has a defined season; whether the 
season is determined by a governing athletics  
                                                 
149. Id.; see also Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 442–43 (quoting Monroe, supra note 14, at 2);  
Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (quoting Monroe, supra note 14, at 2); Glatt, supra note 12, at 307 (“A 
team may only be counted for Title IX purposes if it receives similar resources to and is organized in a 
manner consistent with other university teams.  Athletic scholarships and recruiting factor into this part 
of the analysis.”) (citation omitted) (citing Monroe, supra note 14). 
150. Monroe, supra note 14, at 3. 
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organization, an athletic conference, or a consortium. 
 
C. If pre-season and/or post-season competition exists for the 
activity, whether the activity provides an opportunity for  
student athletes to engage in the pre-season and/or post-season 
competition in a manner consistent with established varsity 
sports; for example, whether state, national and/or conference 
championships exist for the activity; and 
D. Whether the primary purpose of the activity is to provide 
athletic competition at the intercollegiate or interscholastic  
varsity levels rather than to support or promote other athletic 
activities. 
 
When analyzing this factor, the following may be taken into 
consideration: 
 
1. Whether the activity is governed by a specific set of rules 
of play adopted by a state, national, or conference  
organization and/or consistent with established varsity 
sports, which include objective, standardized criteria by 
which competition must be judged; 
2. Whether resources for the activity (e.g., practice and 
competition schedules, coaching staff) are based on the 
competitive needs of the team; 
3. If post-season competition opportunities are available, 
whether participation in post-season competition is  
dependent on or related to regular season results in a  
manner consistent with established varsity sports; and 
4. Whether the selection of teams/participants is based on 
factors related primarily to athletic ability.151 
                                                 
151. Id. at 3–4 (footnote omitted); see also Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (quoting Monroe, supra 
note 14, at 3–4); Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 90–91.  Or, as one author put it:  
 
An “athletic opportunity” exists only when a team has competitive opportunities that 
match those of other university teams.  If the team in question’s schedule, postseason 
play, or practice opportunities are incomparable to those of other university teams, 
then the questionable group does not qualify as a sports team for the purposes of Title 
IX.  This focus on competition leads to an inquiry into the availability of opponents 
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Assistant Secretary Monroe concluded the letter with the following: 
 
It is OCR’s policy to encourage compliance with the Title IX 
athletics regulations in a flexible manner that expands, rather 
than limits, student athletic opportunities.  By disseminating 
this list of factors, OCR intends to provide institutions with  
information to include new sports in their athletics programs, 
such as those athletic activities not yet recognized by  
governing athletics organizations and those featured at the 
Olympic games, if they so choose.  Expanding interscholastic 
and intercollegiate competitive athletic opportunities through 
new sports can benefit students by creating and stimulating  
student interest in athletics, taking advantage of athletic  
opportunities specific to a particular competitive region, and 
providing the opportunity for access to a wide array of  
competitive athletic activities.152 
 
Although the 2008 Letter sets forth in detail the factors used to determine 
whether an activity is a sport, it does not indicate how those factors should be 
balanced.153  Instead, “how those factors are balanced will depend on the  
circumstances of each case, and th[e] balancing should always be performed 
with an eye towards whether the participants in a putative sport are receiving 
genuine athletic participation opportunities provided to athletes in other  
established varsity sports.”154 
F. Cheerleading as a Sport 
One activity that has often tested the parameters of what constitutes a sport 
is cheerleading.  Almost since the inception of Title IX, agencies, courts, and 
scholars have debated whether cheerleading may be counted as a sport,  
                                                 
from other institutions. Without an adequate pool of possible competitors from other 
universities, the sport in question cannot count as an “athletic opportunity.” 
 
Glatt, supra note 12, at 307 (footnotes omitted) (citing Monroe, supra note 14). 
152. Monroe, supra note 14, at 4; Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (quoting Monroe, supra note 14, 
at 4). 
153. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 100. 
154. Id.; see also Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (“Whether an activity is a ‘sport’ will depend on 
the facts specific to the institution and will be decided based on the totality of those factors.”). 
HEFFERAN ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:34 PM 
612 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:2 
whether for reasons of Title IX compliance or for other purposes. 
1. Agency Pronouncements 
OCR first addressed cheerleading as early as 1975.  In a letter to various 
school and university officials, Peter E. Holmes, Director of OCR, stated that 
“drill teams, cheerleaders and the like, which are covered more generally as  
extracurricular activities . . . are not a part of the institution’s ‘athletic  
program’ within the meaning of the regulation.”155  Following this  
pronouncement, OCR did not address cheerleading again for another  
twenty-five years.  In April 2000, Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea, National  
Coordinator for Title IX Athletics for OCR, wrote to the Executive Director of 
the Minnesota State High School League, reiterating that “[c]onsistent with  
earlier policy statements, there is a presumption by OCR that cheerleading and 
other like activities are extracurricular activities and are not considered sports 
for Title IX purposes.”156   
Following a request from the Minnesota State High School League for  
further clarification, Dr. O’Shea wrote a second letter, dated May 24, 2000.  In 
this letter, Dr. O’Shea acknowledged that Title IX “does not provide  
definitions for . . . ‘cheerleading’ and ‘other like activities,’ nor does OCR have 
definitions of these activities.”157  However, OCR took the position that “the 
term cheerleading in this context includes both competitive and sideline cheer; 
other like activities would include all extracurricular activities similar to drill 
teams and cheerleading, such as danceline, skateline, and pep squads.”158   
                                                 
155. Memorandum from Peter E. Holmes, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, to Chief State Sch. Officers,  
Superintendents of Local Educ. Agencies & Coll. & Univ. Presidents, at 4 (Sept. 1975) (on file with 
the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare/Offices for Civil Rights); see also 
McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 282 n.8 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Memorandum from Peter E. Holmes to Chief State Sch. Officers, supra note 155); Biediger, 
928 F. Supp. 2d at 445 n.37 (stating that HEW ruled in 1975 that cheerleading was an extracurricular 
activity and not a sport); Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 91 n.23 (stating that HEW ruled in 1975 that 
cheerleading was an extracurricular activity and not a sport); Glatt, supra note 12, at 308 (noting that 
OCR warned schools in 1975 “that . . . cheerleading . . . may not be considered part of an institution’s 
‘athletic program.’”); Liguori, supra note 142, at 163 (“As early as 1975, OCR took the position that  
cheerleading was presumptively not a sport.”). 
156. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 129; Biediger, 928 F. 
Supp. 2d at 445 (quoting Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 129); 
Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (quoting Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra 
note 129); Glatt, supra note 12, at 308. 
157. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea, Nat’l Coordinator for Title IX Athletics, Office for Civil 
Rights, to David V. Stead, Exec. Dir., Minn. State High Sch. League (May 24, 2000) (on file with the  
United States Department of Education). 
158. Id.; see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) ([I]n 2000, OCR had 
issued two letters stating that cheerleading, whether of the sideline or competitive variety, was  
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Indeed, over the years, several athletic associations asked OCR to evaluate 
whether sideline and competitive cheerleading could be considered part of a 
school’s athletic program, and “[i]n each case, based on the information  
submitted for evaluation, OCR did not recognize as a sport any of the  
identified activities.”159   
Such was the case in 2009, when OCR investigated a complaint that  
Foster High School (Foster) in the Tukwila School District (Tukwila) in  
Washington discriminated against its female high school students by not  
providing them with equal athletic participation opportunities in its sports  
programs.160  In defending against the allegations, Tukwila asserted that OCR 
should count participants in the Foster cheer program in determining the  
district’s compliance with Title IX.161  During the relevant time period, twelve 
girls participated in Foster’s cheer program.162  The Washington  
Interscholastic Activities Association (WIAA), the governing state athletic  
association, allowed its member schools to offer cheerleading as either a sport 
or an activity, and published rules governing cheer programs.163  The  
applicable rules for cheerleading as a sport set the dates of the regular season 
from November 3 through January 24, set the minimum number of practice days 
at ten, and set the maximum number of interscholastic contests during the  
season at ten.164  The WIAA sponsored a cheerleading state championship.165  
To qualify, a squad must have performed in at least ten school events,  
participated in at least one WIAA or school-sponsored competition, and 
                                                 
presumptively not a sport, and that team members could not be counted as athletes under Title IX.”); 
Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 445 (quoting Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, 
supra note 157); Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 91–92 (quoting Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to 
David V. Stead, supra note 157); Glatt, supra note 12, at 308 (referring to Letter from Dr. Mary Frances 
O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 157). 
159. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 157; Biediger, 691 F.3d 
at 94 (observing that “since 2000, OCR has never recognized an intercollegiate varsity cheerleading 
program to be a sport for Title IX purposes.”); Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 445 (noting that “the OCR 
has never held a varsity cheerleading . . . program to be a sport for Title IX purposes”); Biediger, 728 
F. Supp. 2d at 92 (stating “that, since 2000, OCR has never held an intercollegiate varsity cheerleading 
program to be a sport for Title IX purposes.”). 
160. Letter from Gary D. Jackson, Dir., Seattle Office, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Herb Dempsey, at 1 
(Dec. 16, 2009) (on file with Author). 
161. Id. at 3. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id.  A separate set of rules governed cheerleading as an activity.  Id.  These rules created a 
WIAA spirit committee, allowed the relevant season and practices to be defined by individual school 
districts, designated the winter season as competitive cheerleading season, and stated that “cheerleading  
activities should center on the leading or directing of fans.”  Id. 
165. Id. 
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achieved a minimum qualifying score.166 
Foster’s cheerleading team “served as both [a] spirit and competitive 
squad[.]”167  Its athletic conference the Seamount League considered cheer a 
year-round activity, but did not hold its own cheer competitions.168  The  
district’s “cheerleading squad participated in two competitions during the  
2007–2008 school year but did not participate in any competitions during the 
2008–2009 school year.”169  The 2008–2009 “squad performed at all home and 
away football and boys’ and girls’ basketball games[,]” as well as monthly 
school assemblies.170  Team members were required to pay approximately $600 
to participate in these activities.171  The payments were for items such as  
“form-fitting uniforms, embroidered warm-ups, embroidered briefs, beanies, 
sports bra, raincoat, shoes, bags, and pom-poms.”172  In contrast, “[p]articipants 
on the school’s other athletic teams did not have a requirement that they pay to 
participate.  For those sports, each team member purchased his or her shoes but 
was not required to purchase his or her uniform or warm-ups.”173  The district’s 
high school produced its own cheerleading guidelines, which stated that  
 
[T]he mission of the cheerleading squad is to promote and  
uphold school spirit, unity, and pride; to represent the school to 
the highest degree; to set an example of good behavior and 
sportsmanship at all times, whether in uniform or not; and to 
encourage school spirit and pride in the school.174 
 
The guidelines made no mention of cheerleading competition.175 
In determining whether Tukwila provided equal athletic opportunities, OCR 
looked at whether the opportunities were provided in the context of a “sport.”176  
OCR again stressed that it  
                                                 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 4. 
169. Id. 
170. Id.  “During the . . . school year, there were . . . 9 football [games], 23 boys [sic] basketball 




174. Id. at 5. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 8. 
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does not use a specific definition of the term sport but instead  
considers several factors related to an activity’s structure,  
administration, team preparation, and competition, when  
determining whether an activity is a sport that OCR counts as part 
of a district’s interscholastic athletics program for the purpose of 
determining compliance with 34 C.F.R. 106.41(c)(1).177 
 
  In the case at hand, OCR decided not to include Foster’s cheerleading  
program “as an athletic activity for purposes of determining the [female]  
participation rate[] . . . in the district’s interscholastic athletics program.”178  
OCR delineated the following considerations in support of its determination: 
 
Participants in the district’s cheerleading . . . program[] are  
required to pay a substantial fee in order to participate; there is 
no competition within the Seamount League; the squads  
participate in a limited number of competitions; the mission, 
guidance, and rules for the activities emphasize performance 
rather than competition; and the focus of the activities is on 
supporting the school’s sports rather than competition.179 
 
Therefore, based on its weighing of the numerous factors, OCR found that 
“on balance” Foster’s cheerleading program was not a sport because it was “not 
comparable” to the district’s “established varsity sports.”180 
In sum, there is not a single instance to date in which OCR found any form 
of intercollegiate varsity cheerleading program—competitive or otherwise—to 
be a sport for Title IX purposes.181  However, notwithstanding the consistent 
pattern of contrary pronouncements and determinations detailed above, OCR 
has not completely foreclosed the possibility of cheerleading one day being  
considered a sport whose participants may be counted for purposes of Title IX.  
                                                 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 5. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 8; see also Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 446–47. 
181. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2012); Biediger v. Quinnipiac 
Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 445 (D. Conn. 2013); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 
92 (D. Conn. 2010); cf. Kristina Sowder et al., Defining “Sport,” MOMENTUM MEDIA (Feb./Mar. 
2004), http://www.momentummedia.com/articles/am/am1602/cheerdefine.htm (“[D]espite popularity 
and an increasingly competitive focus, dance and cheerleading are not uniformly recognized as sports 
by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the NCAA, the NFHS, or the Women’s Sports Foundation.”). 
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While steadfastly maintaining its presumption that cheerleading activities are 
not countable participation opportunities, OCR has always been careful to state 
that any determination as to whether a particular school’s program  
constitutes a sport must be made on a case-by-case basis.182  This “leav[es] open 
the possibility for a different conclusion with respect to a particular cheerleading 
program.”183 
2. Non-Title IX Case Law 
Although Biediger is the first decision to comprehensively analyze  
whether cheerleading constitutes a sport for purposes of Title IX, a handful of 
cases have discussed the question outside of the Title IX context.184  The  
subject appears to arise most frequently in the insurance context.  In Garcia v. 
St. Bernard Parish School Board,185 the Supreme Court of Louisiana  
considered “whether the insurance policy issued to the [defendant] School 
Board excluded coverage for an injury sustained by a high school cheerleader 
while performing [a] . . . stunt during a football game.”186  The plaintiff was 
tossing another cheerleader as part of a maneuver known as a basket toss “when 
the tossed cheerleader landed on [plaintiff’s] knee,” injuring her.187  “Plaintiff 
filed [a] negligence action against the [School] Board and its general liability 
insurer.”188  The policy provision in question stated that “the insurance does not 
apply . . . to any person while practicing for or participating in any contest or 
exhibition of an athletic or sports nature sponsored by the named insured.”189  
“The insurer moved for a summary judgment, asserting that the pertinent policy 
provision excluded coverage for [plaintiff’s] injury” because she was  
                                                 
182. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 445; Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, 
supra note 129. 
183. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 103. 
184. See, e.g., Wieker v. Mesa Cty. Valley Sch. Dist. #51, No. 05-cv-806-WYD-CBS, 2007 WL 
595629, at *5, 8–9 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2007) (finding that the defendant school district offered no  
authority for counting participants on the cheerleading team as part of the total number of athletic  
participants in assessing substantial proportionality, but granting summary judgment to the school  
district on the third prong of the three-prong test); McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of 
Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 282 n.8 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that while the defendant school district 
listed cheerleading as a sport, and plaintiffs did not dispute the categorization, “[t]he case [did] not 
require [the court] to make a determination about whether cheerleading . . . [was] a sport within the 
meaning of . . . Title IX,” although expressing skepticism that it was). 
185. See generally 576 So.2d 975 (La. 1991). 
186. Id. at 975. 
187. Id. at 976. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 975. 
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“participating in an exhibition of a sports nature sponsored by [defendant].”190 
 In order for the exclusion to apply, the court required the insurer to prove 
each of the following: 
 
(1) [T]hat the event in which the person was injured was a  
contest or exhibition; (2) that the contest or exhibition was of 
an athletic or sports nature; (3) that the contest or exhibition 
was sponsored by the named insured; and (4) that the injured 
person was practicing for or participating in the contest or  
exhibition at the time of the injury.191 
 
“[W]hile conceding that [plaintiff] was not a participant in the football  
contest, [the insurer] argue[d] that a cheerleader, while leading cheers at a  
football game, is participating in an exhibition and that cheerleading itself is of 
an athletic nature.”192 
The court disagreed: 
 
The risks normally encountered in a sports contest which the 
policy provision clearly intended to exclude under the  
circumstances of this case were injuries sustained in the  
football game.  None of the cases reviewed from other  
jurisdictions involved an injury in an exhibition ancillary to the 
principal contest sponsored by the insured.  While a school 
board typically sponsors additional activities incidental to  
football contests, such as performances by cheerleaders, bands, 
pep squads, flag squads, drill teams and the like, these groups 
are not participants in the football contest, and an injury to a 
member of these groups during a football game is not clearly 
within the contemplation of the policy provision.193 
 
The court conceded that “the policy provision may apply to injuries during 
cheerleading contests, either intramural or in competition among several 
schools, but here there was no contest and no winner to be chosen.”194   
                                                 
190. Id. at 976. 
191. Id. at 976–77. 
192. Id. at 977. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, the exclusion could also apply “to injuries during an exhibition of 
cheerleading which is an independent event sponsored by the school, but here 
there was no . . . cheerleading exhibition independent of the football  
contest.”195  However, the court noted that, “even if this cheerleading were an 
exhibition contemplated by the [exclusion],” it was not “of an athletic or sports 
nature.”196  While the acrobatic stunt in which the plaintiff was participating at 
the time of her injury was of an athletic nature, “a cheerleader at a football game, 
for most of the game except for a few acrobatic stunts, is not generally engaged 
in activities of an athletic or sports nature.”197  Thus, the policy provision at 
issue did “not clearly exclud[e] injuries sustained while cheerleading at a  
football game sponsored by the named insured.”198 
While other courts have likewise concluded that cheerleading should not be 
considered a sport,199 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reached a contrary result 
based on the language and definitions of a state statute.  In Noffke v. Bakke, both 
plaintiff and defendant were varsity high school basketball cheerleaders. 200  One 
night, the parties were practicing a cheerleading stunt prior to a game, without 
any mats.201  During the stunt, plaintiff fell backward and struck her head on the 
tile floor, resulting in injury.202  Plaintiff brought suit, alleging that defendant’s 
negligence in failing to properly spot her during the stunt caused her injuries.203  
Defendant “moved for summary judgment asserting that he was immune from 
liability” pursuant to a state statute.204 
                                                 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 977 n.2. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 977. 
199. See, e.g., Hinterberger v. Iroquois Sch. Dist., 548 F. App’x 50, 53 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013) (“At the 
time of Hinterberger’s accident, the PIAA did not officially recognize cheerleading as a sport and  
accordingly did not issue rules pertaining to cheerleading.”); Hinterberger v. Iroquois Sch. Dist., 898 
F. Supp. 2d 772, 781 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (“Cheerleading is not an activity sanctioned by the Pennsylvania 
Interscholastic Athletic Association, as it is not recognized as a sport.  Accordingly, neither the PIAA 
nor the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have adopted any rules or regulations regarding the conduct 
of high school cheerleading practices, performances, or competitions.”); Gonzalez v. Univ. Sys. of 
N.H., No. 451217, 2005 WL 530806, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2005) (“Cheerleading was not a 
sport or athletic event but, rather, a self-governing special interest club with twelve members.”); Hacker 
v. Colonial League, 56 Pa. D. & C.4th 281, 287 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2001) (“The Colonial League contends 
that it does not recognize cheerleading as a sport, however, it does recognize that it is an activity which 
supports and enhances interscholastic athletic contests.”). 
200. 2009 WI 10, ¶¶ 3–4, 760 N.W.2d 156. 
201. Id. ¶ 3. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. ¶ 6. 
204. Id. ¶ 7 (citing WIS. STAT. § 895.525(4m)(a) (2016)). 
HEFFERAN ARTICLE  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:34 PM 
2016] A SPORTING CHANCE  619 
The statute in question, which addressed the liability of contact sport  
participants, provided: 
 
A participant in a recreational activity that includes physical 
contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams, 
including teams in recreational, municipal, high school and  
college leagues, may be liable for an injury inflicted on  
another participant during and as part of that sport in a tort  
action only if the participant who caused the injury acted  
recklessly or with intent to cause injury.205 
 
For purposes of the statute, “recreational activity” meant the following: 
 
[A]ny activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise,  
relaxation or pleasure, including practice or instruction in any 
such activity.  “Recreational activity” includes hunting, fishing, 
trapping, camping, bowling, billiards, picnicking, exploring 
caves, nature study, dancing, bicycling, horseback riding, 
horseshoe-pitching, bird-watching, motorcycling, operating an 
all-terrain vehicle, ballooning, curling, throwing darts, hang 
gliding, hiking, tobogganing, sledding, sleigh riding, snowmo-
biling, skiing, skating, participation in water sports, weight and 
fitness training, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or remov-
ing wood, climbing observation towers, animal training, har-
vesting the products of nature, sport shooting and any other 
sport, game or educational activity.206 
 
Thus, to be entitled to statutory “immunity, a defendant must be  
(1) participating in a recreational activity; (2) that recreational activity must  
include physical contact between persons; (3) the persons must be  
participating in a sport; and (4) the sport must involve amateur teams.”207 
The plaintiff argued that the statute “provide[d] immunity only to those  
persons . . . competing in a contact sport.”208  Because cheerleading was  
neither competitive nor a contact sport, according to the plaintiff, the  
                                                 
205. Id. ¶ 14 (quoting § 895.525(4m)(a)). 
206. Id. ¶ 15 (quoting § 895.525(2)). 
207. Id. ¶ 16. 
208. Id. ¶ 13. 
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defendant was not entitled to immunity.209  The defendant countered by  
arguing “that the plain language of the statute render[ed] him immune from neg-
ligence because cheerleading involve[d] physical contact.”210  The court agreed 
with the defendant and held that he was “immune from liability  
because he was participating in a recreational activity that includes physical 
contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams.”211 
The court began its analysis by finding that cheerleading indisputably  
constituted a recreational activity.212  Although recognizing that “the question 
of whether cheerleading is a sport has apparently ‘been a matter of public  
debate,’”213 the court also readily concluded that cheerleading was a sport,  
because it was “‘[a]n activity involving physical exertion and skill that is  
governed by a set of rules or customs.’”214  It did not matter that the parties were 
not engaged in competition at the time of plaintiff’s injury, because, while “a 
sport is ‘often undertaken competitively,’ the definition does not  
require competition,” neither does the statute.215  Moreover, “cheerleaders  
often engage in competition with the opponent’s cheerleaders not only during a 
game but also during organized competitions.”216  Finally, the court believed 
that to “constru[e] the word ‘sport’ to exclude cheerleading . . . is inconsistent 
with the purpose of the statute.”217 
Having held that cheerleading constituted both a recreational activity and a 
sport, the court further concluded that the parties’ activity involved amateur 
teams and physical contact as well.218  Accordingly, because cheerleaders such 
as the defendant “participate in a recreational activity that includes physical  
                                                 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. ¶¶ 3, 58. 
212. Id. ¶¶ 13, 16.  
213. Id. ¶ 32 n.10. 
214. Id. ¶ 32 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1742 
(3d ed. 1992)). 
215. Id. ¶ 17 n.3. 
216. Id. ¶ 31 n.8. 
217. Id. ¶ 32.  Indeed, the court felt that the parties themselves had impliedly recognized that  
cheerleading constituted a sport by focusing the majority of their arguments on the “physical contact” 
requirement of the statute.  See id. ¶ 32 n.10. 
218. Id. ¶ 23.  Specifically, the court noted that “cheerleaders are on amateur teams because a team 
is ‘[a] group organized to work together’ and cheerleaders . . . are a group dedicated to leading fan 
participation and taking part in competitions.”  Id. ¶ 17 (alteration in original) (citation omitted)  
(quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 214, at 
1842).  Cheerleading also “involves a significant amount of physical contact between the cheerleaders 
that at times results in a forceful interaction between the participants,” including “when one person is 
tossed high into the air and then caught by those same tossers.”  Id. ¶ 23. 
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contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams,” they are immune 
from negligence actions.219 
Other courts in other jurisdictions have echoed Noffke in construing  
cheerleading as a sport, albeit outside the parameters of Title IX.220 
III. THE BIEDIGER DECISIONS 
In the course of the Biediger litigation, the United States District Court for 
the District of Connecticut and the United States Court of Appeals for the  
Second Circuit became the first federal courts to apply OCR’s test for  
determining what constitutes a sport for purposes of Title IX.221  The activity at 
issue was competitive cheerleading.222  “Competitive cheer[leading] is an  
outgrowth of traditional sideline cheerleading. . . . [involving] many of the 
moves and techniques that sideline cheer[leaders] . . .” use.223  However, while 
                                                 
219. Id. 
220. See, e.g., Patterson v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 743 F.3d 1160, 1162 (8th Cir. 2014) (“It may 
surprise some to learn that cheerleading is, by some measures, the second most dangerous college sport 
in the country.”) (emphasis added); Brindisi v. Regano, 20 F. App’x 508, 510 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001)  
(noting, in dicta, that “[c]heerleading is probably as much a sport as those more traditionally conceived 
like football and soccer.  . . . Cheerleading is more dangerous, in terms of serious injuries per minute 
of participation, than all but two mens’ [sic] high school sports.  . . .  Cheerleaders compete in national 
and even international competitions. . . . The internet portal yahoo.com lists ‘cheerleading’ under its 
category ‘sports.’” (citations omitted) (citing Fontes v. Irvine Unified Sch. Dist., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521, 
524 (1994); Am. Cheerleader, http://www.americancheerleader.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2016)); 
White v. Cleary, No. 09–4324 (PGS), 2012 WL 924338, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2012) (noting that the 
defendant school district recognized cheerleading as a sport and paid cheerleading coaches according 
to its coach salary guide); Williams v. Clinton Cent. Sch. Dist., 872 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (App. Div. 
2009) (“by performing her cheerleading routine on a bare wood gym floor . . . ‘plaintiff assumed the 
risks of the sport in which she voluntarily engaged.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Fisher v. Syosset Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 694 N.Y.S.2d 691, 691 (App. Div. 1999)); Rendine v. St. John’s Univ., 735 N.Y.S.2d 173, 
174 (App. Div. 2001) (finding that “plaintiff assumed the risks of the sport in which she voluntarily 
engaged including the obvious risk that she might fall onto the floor while she and her partner were 
performing the stunt.”) (emphasis added) (citing Fisher, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 691); Fisher, 694 N.Y.S.2d 
at 692 (holding that “plaintiff[], who voluntarily participated in extracurricular, school-sponsored 
cheerleading activities, [and] hurt her thumb while practicing a maneuver,” had “assumed the risks of 
the sport in which she voluntarily engaged, including the obvious risk that she might fall onto the hard 
floor where the team was practicing.”) (emphasis added); see also Sowder et al., supra note 181  
(advocating that cheerleading be considered a sport, based on surveys of NCAA schools, because it is 
“characterized by fitness . . . [involves] the physical elements that typically define sport (endurance, 
strength, power, agility, flexibility),” and has “structure, organization, and competition . . . [and]  
identified rules and judging criteria”). 
221. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 94 (D. Conn. 2010); Biediger v. Quinnipiac 
Univ., 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012). 
222. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 439 (recognizing the district court in Biediger as “the first federal 
court to consider whether competitive cheer could count as a varsity sport for purposes of gender equity 
under Title IX.”). 
223. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 78. 
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sideline cheerleading primarily involves entertaining audiences and soliciting 
crowd responses at other teams’ games, competitive cheerleaders “compete to 
win.”224  Competitive cheerleaders do not use the props commonly associated 
with sideline cheerleading—items such as pom-poms, megaphones, and 
signs.225  They wear uniforms similar to volleyball players, rather than  
traditional sideline cheerleading uniforms.226  Finally, competitive cheerleading 
“emphasize[s] the more gymnastic elements of sideline cheerleading, such as 
aerial maneuvers, floor tumbling, and balancing exercises, to the exclusion of 
those activities intended to rally the watching audience.”227 
The task before the federal courts in the Biediger litigation was to  
determine whether the activity of competitive cheerleading as described above 
constituted a sport for purposes of Title IX, so that its participants could be 
counted among the genuine athletic participation opportunities provided to 
women under the substantial proportionality prong of the three-part test.  This 
section details the factual background and legal analysis underpinning these 
groundbreaking decisions. 
A. The 2010 District Court Decision 
In 2006, Quinnipiac University (Quinnipiac) transitioned its athletics  
program from NCAA Division II to NCAA Division I.228 The debt created by 
new facilities built in connection with the transition contributed to budgetary 
difficulties in the ensuing years.229  In March 2009, Quinnipiac announced plans 
to cut its men’s golf team, men’s outdoor track team, and women’s  
volleyball team, while adding a new women’s competitive cheerleading team 
for the 2009–2010 season.230  Faced with the prospect of having their team  
eliminated, five members of the volleyball team along with their coach, filed an 
action in federal court alleging that Quinnipiac’s decision to eliminate the  





228. Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Hurricane Warning Flag for Olympic Sports: Compliance Practices 
in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University Signal a Risk to Women’s and Men’s Olympic Sports, 52 B.C.  L. 
REV. 465, 481 (2011). 
229. See id. at 481–82. 
230. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 63.  Apparently, Quinnipiac was faced with a space crunch and 
wanted to eliminate the volleyball program to free up the facility being used by the team for other 
activities.  Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 471 n.64; Carolyn Davis, Note, Leave It on the Field: Too 
Expansive an Approach to Evaluating Title IX Compliance in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University?, 76 
BROOK. L. REV. 265, 276 (2010).  
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volleyball team violated Title IX and its associated regulations.231  The parties 
severed and the district court held a one-week bench trial on the plaintiffs’ claim 
“that Quinnipiac discriminate[d] on the basis of sex in its allocation of athletic 
participation opportunities.”232 
Quinnipiac defended itself against the plaintiffs’ claims of sex  
discrimination by relying on the first prong of the three-prong test set forth in 
the Policy Interpretation.233  Quinnipiac contended that it was in compliance 
with Title IX “because it provides athletic participation opportunities for women 
in numbers substantially proportionate to its undergraduate female  
enrollment.”234  The first prong was the only prong of the three-prong test raised 
by Quinnipiac as a defense; it did not argue that it satisfied either the second or 
third prong of the test.235 
The court used a two-step analysis to determine whether Quinnipiac  
provided substantially proportionate athletic participation opportunities for its 
female students.236  Under the first step, the court would “determin[e] which of 
the University’s putative varsity athletic participation opportunities should be 
counted for Title IX purposes.”237  Only those athletic participation  
opportunities that “afford[ed] an athlete a genuine opportunity to participate in 
a varsity sport” would be counted.238  Moreover, “[t]o be a genuine  
                                                 
231. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 63.  Private actions to enforce Title IX are permitted, because the 
statute expressly allows “‘any person aggrieved’ by an agency’s termination of funding based on a 
finding of non-compliance with the statute to seek judicial review of such agency action.”  Nat’l  
Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 88 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (2016)); see also Mansourian v. Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 964 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010). 
232. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 64. 
233. Id. at 88. 
234. Id.  
235. Id.  Courts have recognized that “relying exclusively on prong one—and forgoing proof [on 
the second and third prongs]—has certain advantages.”  Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 438.  Establishing  
compliance under the second and third prongs usually requires extensive evidentiary production  
“concerning a school’s past gender-equity practices, history of program expansion for women, and  
assessment of athletic interests over time.”  Id.  On the other hand, the first prong permits a school to  
establish gender equity via a mathematical formula, based solely on its current athletic program.  Id.   
Accordingly, “a university which does not wish to engage in extensive compliance analysis may stay 
on the sunny side of Title IX simply by maintaining gender parity between its student body and its 
athletic lineup.”  Id. (quoting Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897–98 (1st Cir. 1993)).  Therefore, 
“as a matter of litigation strategy, singular reliance on prong one allows a defendant-university  
concerned about its prior gender-equity record to avoid intrusive discovery on—and public testimony 
about—the school’s history of sex discrimination in athletics.”  Id.  For this reason, among others, the 
first prong is the prong most used by defendants in Title IX actions.  See Glatt, supra note 12, at 303. 
236. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 93–94. 
237. Id. at 93. 
238. Id. 
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participation opportunity, an athlete must participate in a legitimate ‘sport,’ 
which is assessed by considering the set of factors set forth in the 2008 OCR 
Letter.”239  Once the number of genuine athletic participation opportunities was 
determined, the court proceeded to the second step of the analysis.  This step 
consisted of “compar[ing] the percentage of athletic participation  
opportunities provided to women to the percentage of women enrolled as  
undergraduates,” to determine substantial proportionality.240 
1. Deference 
The court began with an analysis of the level of deference accorded to the 
various relevant administrative pronouncements it would be interpreting.  The 
court found the 1975 Regulations were a reasonable interpretation of Title IX 
promulgated by HEW according to specific congressional delegation and were 
therefore entitled to a high level of deference under Chevron.241  Likewise, the 
Policy Interpretation was previously deemed “both persuasive and not  
unreasonable,” according it deference under either Chevron or Skidmore.242  
Other courts similarly found the 1996 Clarification deserving of deference.243 
 However, no federal court had previously determined the level of  
deference to accord the 2000 and 2008 OCR Letters.244  Be that as it may, the 
court noted that “there seems to be little question that [it] should defer to [the 
Letters] as [a reasonable] interpretation of [OCR’s] own regulations” under 
Martin.245  The court found that the Letters “create[d] a reasonable and  
persuasive method—best captured by the 2008 OCR Letter, which builds upon 
the list of factors first proposed in the April 2000 OCR Letter—for  
determining which activities count as sports for Title IX purposes.”246  The court 
continued: 
 
The 2008 OCR Letter correctly recognizes that an  
                                                 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 94.  The court indicated that substantial proportionality would not be determined purely 
from the statistical figure but would also take account of the particular facts and circumstances, “such 
as whether any shortage in female athletes is large enough to sustain an independent women’s varsity 
team that the University is not presently sponsoring.”  Id. 
241. Id. at 92. 
242. Id. (quoting McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 290 
(2d Cir. 2004)). 
243. Id. (citing, for example, Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 n.9 
(9th Cir. 2010)). 
244. Id. at 92–93; see also Glatt, supra note 12, at 311. 
245. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 93. 
246. Id. 
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intercollegiate sport is defined not only by the activity’s  
athletic elements, but also by its structure, administration, and 
the competition it fosters.  Put differently, the OCR factors  
appropriately weigh not only the physical nature of the  
activity itself, but also how the experience of participating in 
that activity compares to the experience of participating on 
other varsity sports teams.  That inquiry is reasonable,  
persuasive, and entirely consistent with OCR’s goal of ensuring 
not only that female students are offered equal athletic  
participation opportunities, but that those participation oppor-
tunities are real, and not illusory.  For those reasons, I will defer 
to the 2000 and 2008 OCR Letters interpreting OCR’s regula-
tions and will use the method they prescribe for determining 
whether an activity may be treated as a sport under Title IX.247 
2. Whether Competitive Cheerleading Is a “Sport” 
Having determined that all of the relevant agency pronouncements were  
entitled to at least some level of deference, the court proceeded to consider 
whether competitive cheerleading constituted a sport pursuant to the analytical 
framework laid out in the 2008 OCR Letter.  The first consideration under the 
2008 OCR Letter is whether the university is a member of a recognized  
intercollegiate athletic association, such as the NCAA, and whether the  
activity is governed by that association’s rules.248  If so, there is a presumption 
that the activity can be counted as a sport for purposes of Title IX compliance.249 
Quinnipiac is a member of NCAA Division I.  However, competitive  
cheerleading is not a sport recognized by the NCAA.250  Nor have any schools 
sponsoring competitive cheerleading teams even applied to the NCAA for  
designation of competitive cheerleading as an “emerging sport.”251  Likewise, 
                                                 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 93–94. 
249. Id. at 94. 
250. Id.  
251. Id. at 78, 94.  “In 1994, the NCAA adopted the Emerging Sports initiative as part of an overall 
effort to promote the growth of women’s sports. . . . The list of emerging sports for women helps  
member institutions overcome the challenges of adding new women’s sports.”  Buzuvis, supra note 13, 
at 454–55.  According to the NCAA, “[a]n emerging sport is a sport recognized by the NCAA that is 
intended to provide additional athletics opportunities to female student-athletes.”  CRITERIA FOR 
EMERGING SPORTS, supra note 133.  Member institutions may count emerging sports toward “NCAA 
minimum sports-sponsorship and . . . minimum financial aid requirements.”  Id.; see also Biediger, 728 
F. Supp. 2d at 78–79; 2015–16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 20.02.4 (2015) [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL]; Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 455.  An “[e]merging sport[] may become [an official] NCAA 
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DOE does not consider competitive cheerleading a sport for purposes of  
reporting athletic participation data under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act 
(EADA).252  Therefore, the court determined that “competitive cheer is not  
entitled to any presumption in favor of it being considered a sport under Title 
IX.”253  Indeed, in the May 24, 2000 Letter, OCR indicated “cheerleading is 
presumptively not a Title IX sport.”254  Therefore, pursuant to the guidelines set 
forth in the 2008 OCR Letter, the court proceeded to inquire as to whether  
competitive cheerleading should be considered part of Quinnipiac’s  
intercollegiate athletic program based on its program structure and  
administration, as well as its team preparation and competition. 
a. Program Structure and Administration   
The first set of factors considered in determining whether an activity  
constitutes a sport under Title IX coalesces around program structure and  
administration.255  The court found that, in many respects, the competitive cheer 
team was structured and administered in the same way as other,  
recognized sports.256  For instance, the “team’s operating budget, benefits and 
services, and coaching staff are administered by the athletics department in a 
manner consistent with the administration of Quinnipiac’s other varsity 
teams.”257  Team members also received benefits and services on par with  
other varsity teams in areas such as equipment, medical treatment, strength and 
conditioning coaching, study halls, community service opportunities,  
publicity, and eligibility to receive awards and recognition for their  
participation.258  “[T]he . . . coaching staff was administered like the coaching 
                                                 
championship sport[] if at least forty member institutions add the emerging sport within a ten-year 
period,” although exceptions are sometimes granting if the sport is making “‘steady progress’ toward 
that goal.”  Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 455; see also CRITERIA FOR EMERGING SPORTS, supra note 133.  
Current championship sports that originated on the list of emerging sports include rowing, ice hockey, 
water polo, and bowling.  Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 455.  For the 2015–2016 academic year, the NCAA 
lists only rugby, equestrian, and triathlon as emerging sports.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 251, art. 
20.02.4(a)–(b). 
252. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 79.  “The EADA is a law separate from Title IX that requires an  
educational institution receiving federal funding and participating in intercollegiate athletics to report 
its athletic participation data for men and women to the Department of Education.”  Id. at 79 n.18 (citing 
20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (2016)); see also Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 422 n.8 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g)). 
253. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 94. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 95. 
256. Id. 
257. Id.  
258. Id. 
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staff of other Quinnipiac varsity [teams].”259  Finally, while not recognized by 
the NCAA as a varsity sport, “the Quinnipiac competitive cheer team still  
followed applicable NCAA rules, such as . . . practice time restrictions” and 
medical clearance requirements, just like Quinnipiac’s established varsity 
sports.260 
However, the court also found several areas in which the competitive cheer 
team diverged from the typical varsity program at Quinnipiac.  For instance, the 
team did not receive locker room space like other varsity teams.261  Moreover, 
unlike other varsity sports at the school, as a non-recognized sport, competitive 
cheer was not covered by the NCAA’s insurance program, and had to buy its 
own catastrophic insurance coverage from a separate provider.262  Most  
importantly, in contrast to every other varsity sport at Quinnipiac, not a single 
member of the competitive cheer team was recruited off campus, because the 
team’s coach had not passed the NCAA recruitment examination.263 
b. Team Preparation and Competition.   
The court then turned to an examination of the relevant factors relating to 
team preparation and competition.  Pursuant to the criteria established by the 
2008 OCR Letter, the court examined  
 
(1) the quality of the team’s practice opportunities; (2) whether the 
regular season differs quantitatively or qualitatively from the regular 
seasons of other varsity sports; (3) whether the pre- and post-seasons 
are consistent with other varsity sports; and (4) whether the team is 
organized primarily for the purpose of engaging in athletic  
competition.264 
 
The court found no question that two of the factors favored treating  
                                                 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 81. 
261. Id. at 81–82. 
262. Id. at 82, 95. 
263. Id. at 80, 95.  The head coach of Quinnipiac’s competitive cheer team, Mary Ann Powers, was  
formerly the coach of Quinnipiac’s sideline cheer team.  Id. at 80.  At the time she accepted the position 
in 2009, Powers was not familiar with the applicable NCAA and conference recruiting rules and was 
not cleared to recruit any athletes off campus until she passed the NCAA recruitment examination for 
coaches in the spring of 2010.  Id.  Notwithstanding her inability to recruit off campus, Powers believed 
that her on-campus recruiting was sufficient to field a competitive team for the 2009–2010 season.  Id. 
at 81. 
264. Id. at 96. 
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competitive cheerleading as a sport.265  First, “the team’s practices [were]  
similar to the practice regimen for other varsity squads.”266  Quinnipiac also 
satisfied the fourth factor, as the primary purpose of the competitive  
cheerleading team was “to compete athletically at the intercollegiate varsity 
level.”267  However, there were major distinctions between the competitive 
cheerleading team and Quinnipiac’s other varsity sports as to the remaining two 
factors, differences the court ultimately found dispositive.268 
First, the court compared the regular season of Quinnipiac’s competitive 
cheer team to the regular seasons of the school’s other varsity sports.269   
According to the 2008 OCR Letter, in analyzing this factor, the following  
considerations were relevant: “whether the number of competitions and length 
of play are predetermined by a governing athletics organization, conference, or 
consortium of institutions; whether the competitive schedule reflects the team’s 
abilities; and whether the activity’s season is defined by a governing athletics 
organization, conference, or consortium.”270 
Quinnipiac partially satisfied these criteria: along with seven other schools, 
it had “joined and helped establish [an] intercollegiate competitive cheer  
organization [known as] the National Competitive Stunt and Tumbling  
Association (NCSTA).”271  For the 2009–2010 season, the NCSTA determined 
that the competitive cheer season would last 132 days and that each team would 
compete in at least eight contests, including the championship, which would be 
the National Cheerleading Association (NCA) national championship event in 
Daytona Beach, Florida, in April 2010.272  “[T]he NCSTA developed an initial 
set of rules for its competitions during the 2009–10 season.”273  However,  
despite their agreement on these measures, as well as their common belief that 
competitive cheer teams should only engage in competition and not support 
other varsity teams in a sideline capacity, the organization remained “a loosely 
defined, unincorporated association with no board of directors, subcommittees, 
                                                 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 99. 
268. Id. at 96–97. 
269. Id. at 97. 
270. Id.  
271. Id. at 82. 
272. Id. at 82–83. 
273. Id. at 83.  The rules established a scoring system for competitions similar to gymnastics and 
figure skating.  Id.  Teams would select a routine with a predetermined score value to perform at each 
event, and “whether the team[] [met] that score [would] depend[] on the quality and accuracy of [its] 
execution.”  Id.  “Scores [would be] determined by [a] panel[] of five judges.”  Id. 
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voting or petition systems for its members, or other hallmarks of a governing 
national athletics organization.”274  Moreover, the NCSTA “did not establish a 
maximum number of competitive cheer competitions; rules for what kind of 
teams its member schools could play against; or what kinds of scoring systems 
would be permissible at non-NCSTA competitive cheer competitions.”275  Nor 
did it appear that the rules that the NCSTA established were even enforceable; 
the court found no evidence that the NCSTA could penalize its member schools 
for violating the organization’s agreement.276 
As a result of these deficiencies, “the 2009–10 Quinnipiac competitive 
cheer season was marked by inconsistency in terms of whom the University 
competed against and what scoring system was applied.”277  The team  
participated in ten competitions during the 2009–2010 regular season, but only 
two of them were conducted under the auspices of the NCSTA.278  Because the 
competitive cheer season was not governed by a single overseeing body, such 
as the NCAA, the rules varied from competition to competition.279  Indeed, those 
ten contests were conducted according to at least five different scoring rules.280  
The court found that “[n]o other varsity sport was subject to multiple sets of 
governing bodies, and every other Quinnipiac varsity team could  
prepare for games knowing that the rules of competition would remain  
constant.”281 
Moreover, Quinnipiac’s competitive cheer team did not play a schedule that 
reflected its participants’ abilities.282  In its ten regular season contests, the team 
competed against a variety of different opponents, “including other  
collegiate varsity competitive cheer squads, collegiate club competitive cheer 
squads, collegiate sideline cheer teams, all-star squads, and even high school 
cheerleaders.”283  No other varsity team at Quinnipiac played against  
                                                 
274. Id. at 82. 
275. Id. at 97. 
276. Id.  “Indeed, the NCSTA could not even threaten . . . violators . . . [with a] postseason  
[ban]—a stick that the NCAA uses to deter and punish its member schools for violating its  
rules—because the 2009–10 post-season was administered by NCA—a third party . . . over which the 
NCSTA had no authority.”  Id. 
277. Id. at 83. 
278. See id. at 84, 97. 
279. Id. at 97. 
280. Id. at 84, 97. 
281. Id. at 97. 
282. Id. 
283. Id.; see also id. at 84. 
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non-varsity—indeed, in certain cases, non-collegiate—competition.284   
Because “[n]o other Quinnipiac varsity team is forced to play such a motley 
assortment of competitors . . . it cannot be doubted that the quality of  
competition is more variant across the competitive cheer season than across the 
seasons of the University’s other varsity teams.”285 
Not only was the competitive cheer team’s regular season different from the 
school’s other varsity sports, but its postseason differed significantly from  
established varsity sports as well.286  As mentioned above, for the 2009–2010 
season, the competitive cheerleading postseason consisted of competing in the 
NCA national championship event.287  This event “was open to all schools’ 
cheerleading teams; there was no progressive playoff system or entrance  
qualification, such as a ranking system or minimum win tally over the course of 
the season.”288  Indeed, “being a competitive cheerleading team was not a  
prerequisite to participating in the NCA event.”289  Although Quinnipiac  
competed only against other competitive cheer teams at the NCA  
championship, the teams “were not ranked, seeded, or winnowed in any way.”290  
The teams were simply “pitted against each other in a single  
championship round in which the team with the highest score won.  How those 
schools fared in their regular season was irrelevant to their success.”291 
A further issue related to the NCA event was its “fail[ure] to provide a form 
of competition in keeping with Quinnipiac’s season.”292  The rules for the NCA 
event required teams to participate in a “spirit” segment in which their success 
would be judged by the intensity of the crowd response they  
elicited and the number of sponsor props they used.293  At no point in the  
regular season had the team’s score ever been determined by its ability to elicit 
a crowd reaction, which is a hallmark of sideline, not competitive cheer.294  
Needless to say, “[n]o other varsity sport at Quinnipiac introduces a new  
scoring system or element of competition in its championship that was not  
                                                 
284. Id. at 97–98. 
285. Id. at 98. 








294. Id. at 98–99. 
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present during the regular season.”295  Thus, the differences between the  
competitive cheer team and Quinnipiac’s other varsity sports as to both regular 
season and postseason competition counseled against a determination that  
competitive cheerleading constituted a sport for Title IX purposes.296  
In sum, while certain aspects of Quinnipiac’s competitive cheer program 
compared favorably to other varsity sports, “other factors relating to the  
structure, administration, team preparation, and competition” supported a  
finding that, “at this point in time, the University’s competitive cheer team  
cannot count as a sport under Title IX.”297  The court then balanced the various 
factors, with an eye towards whether the members of the competitive cheer team 
“are receiving genuine athletic participation opportunities equivalent to the  
opportunities provided to athletes in other established varsity sports.”298  The 
court believed that the three deciding factors in the analysis were the  
competitive cheer team’s inability to recruit off campus; its inconsistent  
regular season, in terms of both the rules governing team competitions, as well 
as the type and quality of opponents; and its “aberrant” postseason, involving a 
new form of competition and no entrance qualification or progressive playoff 
system.299  These factors led the court “to conclude that the women’s  
competitive cheer team was not a varsity sport under Title IX.”300 
Notwithstanding the court’s conclusion that Quinnipiac’s competitive cheer 
team, as currently constituted, would not be counted as a sport for Title IX  
purposes, it is important to note that the court did not close the door  
entirely on the issue.  While “the activity is still too underdeveloped and  
disorganized to be treated as offering genuine varsity athletic participation  
opportunities for students,” competitive cheerleading “may, some time in the 
future, qualify as a sport for the purposes of Title IX.”301  Indeed, the court  
expressed 
  
little doubt that at some point in the near future—once  
competitive cheer is better organized and defined, and surely in 
the event that the NCAA recognizes the activity as an emerging 
sport—competitive cheer will be acknowledged as a bona fide 
                                                 
295. Id. at 99. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 100. 
299. Id. at 99–100. 
300. Id. at 100. 
301. Id. at 64. 
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sporting activity by academic institutions, the public, and the 
law.302   
 
However, “that time has not yet arrived,” and, accordingly, Quinnipiac 
could not yet count the members of its competitive cheer team as genuine  
athletic participation opportunities for purposes of compliance with the  
substantial proportionality prong of the three-part test for Title IX  
compliance.303 
3. Substantial Proportionality 
Having determined which athletic participation opportunities would be 
counted, the court then proceeded to compare the percentage of athletic  
participation opportunities provided to women to the percentage of women  
enrolled as undergraduates, to determine substantial proportionality.  For the 
2009–2010 school year, of the 5,686 students enrolled at Quinnipiac, 2,168  
students, or 38.13%, were male, while 3,518 students, or 61.87%, were  
female.304  Quinnipiac argued that even after eliminating the women’s  
volleyball team, it still offered athletic participation opportunities for women 
substantially proportional to the university’s female undergraduate  
                                                 
302. Id. at 101.  Quinnipiac provided evidence of various changes instituted by the NCSTA for the  
2010–2011 season in an effort to convince the court that competitive cheerleading constituted a sport.  
See id. at 84–85.  For instance, in 2010–2011, the NCSTA held its championship independent of the 
NCA, required its schools to compete in six competitions, at least half of which had to follow NCSTA 
rules and format and be against at least one other collegiate team, and determined that NCSTA  
membership would be available to all competitive cheer teams sponsored as varsity teams, as well as 
to club teams at schools committed to sponsoring them as varsity programs eventually.  Id. The NCSTA 
also agreed to “apply to the NCAA for competitive cheer to be recognized as an emerging sport.”  Id. 
at 85.  However, every NCSTA team would still qualify to compete at the new championship event, 
regardless of record.  See id. at 84.  Moreover, the NCSTA still “has not[] created a permanent set of 
bylaws to govern competitive cheer,” with its “rules remain[ing] somewhat in flux.”  Id. at 85.  Nor did 
Quinnipiac seek a letter from OCR determining that its competitive cheer team counted as athletic 
participants for purposes of Title IX.  Id.  Finally, as Quinnipiac conceded, competitive cheer could not 
be approved as an emerging sport because there were not yet sufficient teams to meet the NCAA’s 
requirements.  Id.  The most recent edition of the NCAA Division I Manual still does not list  
competitive cheer as an emerging sport.  See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 251, art. 20.02.4(a)–(b).  
Thus, the court remained unconvinced that the changes would be adequate to support a  
conclusion that competitive cheerleading could count as a sport under Title IX for the 2010–2011  
season.  Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 113. 
303. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 101. 
304. Id. at 64.  This ratio presented a significant hurdle to Quinnipiac’s attempt to demonstrate 
substantial proportionality, especially since NCAA Division I schools must offer at least fourteen 
sports, no fewer than six of which are for men.  Hogshead-Makar, supra note 228, at 482. 
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enrollment.305  According to Quinnipiac’s numbers, it had 282 female athletes 
out of 450 athletes overall for the 2009–2010 school year.306  These figures 
would “result[] in 62.67 percent of the school’s athletic participation  
opportunities being assigned to women,” which would satisfy the substantial 
proportionality prong.307  However, based on its conclusion that competitive 
cheerleading did not constitute a sport providing genuine athletic participation 
opportunities for purposes of Title IX, the court removed all thirty members of 
the competitive cheer team from Quinnipiac’s count of female participation  
opportunities, along with eleven additional athletes.308  After making these  
reductions, the court found that females comprised 61.87% of Quinnipiac’s  
undergraduate enrollment, but received only 58.25% of the school’s athletic 
participation opportunities—a disparity of 3.62%.309 
The court then determined whether the 3.62% disparity in the percentage of 
athletic participation opportunities offered to females was nevertheless  
sufficient to be considered substantial proportionality for purposes of  
satisfying the first prong and acknowledged that the difference represented, “in 
strictly numeric terms, a borderline case of disproportionate athletic  
opportunities for women.”310  However, based upon the guidance of the 1996 
Clarification, “raw numbers are only part of the analysis for whether the  
participation of women in a school’s varsity program is proportional to  
enrollment.”311  OCR also established “other factors designed to give context 
and meaning to a school’s shortfall of athletic opportunities for students of a 
specific sex.”312  Specifically, the court needed to focus on “whether natural 
fluctuations in enrollment contributed to the lack of proportionality, and 
whether the absolute number of athletic participation opportunities that need to 
be created to achieve exact proportionality would be sufficient to sustain a  
viable athletic team.”313 
As to the first of these factors, “there is no indication that the disparity is 
                                                 
305. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 86. 
306. Id. at 87. 
307. Id. at 65, 87. 
308. Id. at 111.  The additional eleven athletes removed by the court from the tally of female athletic  
participation opportunities were cross-country runners who the court refused to “double count” as  
indoor and outdoor track participants, where those individuals were injured or red-shirted during the 
indoor and outdoor track seasons.  See id. at 73-78, 111. 
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attributable to a surge of women enrolling at Quinnipiac,”314 nor could the  
disparity “be attributed to any unanticipated drop in female athletic  
participation or spike in male athletic participation.”315  Quinnipiac imposed 
carefully selected roster targets for all of its teams and “took meticulous steps 
to ensure that its roster targets were met over the course of the year.”316  Thus, 
there were “no natural fluctuations in Quinnipiac’s enrollment or [athletic  
participation] that would explain the disparity.”317 
As to the second additional factor, the court found that “the 3.62 percent 
disparity represent[ed] a shortfall of approximately 38 female athletes.”318  This 
would be more than enough to sustain an additional female varsity team.319   
Indeed, such a team already existed—the women’s volleyball team the school 
was trying to eliminate.  Accordingly, “[a]lthough a [sic] 3.62 percent is not an 
overwhelming disparity, it is sufficient to show an absence of substantial  
proportionality on the facts of this case.”320 
Based on all of the above, the 3.62% disparity in female athletic  
participation opportunities established that “Quinnipiac did not offer athletic 
participation opportunities for women that were substantially proportional to the 
University’s female enrollment,” and, therefore, “does not fall within the 1979 
Policy Interpretation’s first safe harbor for Title IX compliance.”321  The court 
held, as a matter of law, that Quinnipiac violated Title IX and  
“discriminated on the basis of sex during the 2009–2010 academic year by  
failing to provide equal athletic participation opportunities for women.”322 
As a remedy, the court “enjoined [Quinnipiac] from continuing to  
discriminate against its female students on the basis of sex by failing to  
provide equal athletic participation opportunities.”323  It also ordered Quinnipiac 
to “submit a compliance plan describing how it will bring itself into Title IX 
compliance for 2010–2011 and thereafter.”324  The compliance plan had to  
commit to sponsoring a women’s volleyball team for at least the 2010–2011 
                                                 
314. Id. at 111–12. 





320. Id. at 113. 
321. Id. at 112–13. 
322. Id. at 64; see also id. at 113. 
323. Id. at 114. 
324. Id. at 113. 
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school year.325 
B. The Second Circuit Decision 
Quinnipiac appealed the district court’s injunction to the Second  
Circuit.326  The school argued that the district court erred by excluding all  
thirty roster positions on the competitive cheer team from its tally of female 
athletic participation opportunities, on the basis that it was not a varsity sport 
for Title IX purposes.327  Even if those athletes were not counted, Quinnipiac 
further contended that the district court erred in finding the resulting 3.62%  
disparity between the percentage of participation opportunities afforded  
female athletes and the percentage of female undergraduate enrollment to  
constitute a Title IX violation.328 
Where an appellant challenges the “basis [of injunctive relief] in law and 
fact, [an appellate court] review[s] the district court’s factual findings only for 
clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.”329  Like the district court, the 
Second Circuit began its analysis of the substantial proportionality prong, the 
only prong on which Quinnipiac elected to defend itself,330 by determining the 
number of participation opportunities afforded by the school’s intercollegiate 
athletic program to male and female athletes.331  Also like the district court, the 
Second Circuit  
 
conclude[d] that the 1996 Clarification . . . and the 2000 and 
2008 OCR Letters [were] likewise entitled to substantial  
deference under Auer v. Robbins332 . . . because they reflect rea-
sonable agency interpretations of ambiguities in its own  
regulation, and there is no reason to think that the agency’s  
interpretations do not reflect its “fair and considered judgment 
                                                 
325. Id. at 114. 
326. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2012). 
327. Id. at 91, 96. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. at 96.  While the district court’s “finding of sex discrimination [was] incorporated in a 
declaratory judgment that [was] not yet final and . . . appealable,” the Second Circuit determined that 
it “nevertheless ha[d] jurisdiction to review the finding because it [was] ‘inextricably intertwined’ with 
the challenged injunctive relief over which [the court did possess] interlocutory appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).”  Id. (citing Lamar Advert. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 
356 F.3d 365, 371-72 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
330. Id. at 98. 
331. Id. at 93. 
332. See generally 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
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on the matter in question.”333   
 
Moreover, “even if . . . the 1996 Clarification and [2000 and 2008 OCR L]etters 
were not entitled to Auer deference, they would be entitled to substantial  
deference under United States v. Mead Corp.334 because their logical  
consistency with the agency’s earlier 1979 Policy Interpretation amplifies their 
‘power to persuade.’”335 
1. Whether Competitive Cheerleading Constitutes a “Sport” 
After establishing the legal framework, the Second Circuit provided a  
detailed description of the district court’s application and analysis of the  
various factors set forth in the 2008 OCR Letter that went into its conclusion 
that the members of the competitive cheer team could not be counted under Title 
IX, because the activity did not afford the participation opportunities of a varsity 
sport.336  “Quinnipiac question[ed] the weight the district court assigned the  
various factors it identified as supporting or undermining recognition of  
competitive cheer[] as a genuine varsity sport” for Title IX purposes and also 
asserted that the court should review the issue de novo.337  While the Second 
Circuit “generally accord[s] considerable discretion to a factfinder in deciding 
what weight to assign competing evidence pointing toward different  
conclusions,” the issue was irrelevant.338  This was because  
                                                 
333. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 96–97 (footnote added) (citation omitted) (quoting Mullins v. City of 
New York, 653 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2011)).  In Auer v. Robbins, where Congress had not directly 
spoken on the issue, the Supreme Court determined that it “must sustain the Secretary [of Labor’s  
interpretation of an overtime wage exemption] so long as it is ‘based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.’”  Auer, 519 U.S. at 457 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).  Because the test used by the Secretary was “a creature of the Secretary’s 
own regulations, his interpretation of it,” which “simply cannot be said to be unreasonable,” was  
“controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”  Id. at 458, 461 (quoting 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
334. See generally 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
335. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 97 (footnote added) (citation omitted) (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline  
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2169 (2012)).  United States v. Mead Corp. found “room at least to 
raise a Skidmore claim [of deference] here, where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and [the 
agency] can bring the benefit of specialized experience to bear on” the subtle questions at issue.  Mead, 
533 U.S. at 235.  An agency ruling in such a “situation may therefore at least seek a respect proportional 
to its ‘power to persuade.’”  Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).  “Such 
a ruling may surely claim the merit of its writer’s thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior  
interpretations, and any other sources of weight.”  Id. 
336. See Biediger, 691 F.3d at 102–05. 
337. Id. at 105. 
338. Id. 
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[E]ven assuming that de novo review were warranted, we  
conclude for the same reasons stated in detail by the district 
court and summarized in this opinion that, although there are 
facts on both sides of the argument, in the end, the balance tips 
decidedly against finding competitive cheerleading presently to 
be a “sport” whose participation opportunities should be 
counted for purposes of Title IX.339 
 
Like the district court, the Second Circuit acknowledged “that competitive 
cheer[] can be physically challenging, requiring competitors to possess 
‘strength, agility, and grace.’”340  Similarly, the Second Circuit did not  
“foreclose the possibility that [competitive cheer], with better organization and 
defined rules, might some day warrant recognition as a varsity sport.”341   
However, the Second Circuit echoed the district court in concluding that “that 
time has not yet arrived.”342  Thus, the Second Circuit held “that the district 
court was correct not to count the 30 roster positions assigned to competitive 
cheerleading in determining the number of genuine varsity athletic participation 
opportunities that Quinnipiac afforded female students.”343 
2. Substantial Proportionality 
The Second Circuit next addressed Quinnipiac’s argument that, even if the 
members of the competitive cheerleading team were properly excluded from the 
tally of athletic participation opportunities, the resulting 3.62% disparity  
between female athletic participation opportunities and female undergraduate 
enrollment did not support the finding of a Title IX violation.344  Quinnipiac 
asserted that this disparity was too small to support a finding that the school 
failed to provide athletic participation opportunities to its female students in 
substantial proportion to their enrollment.345  Quinnipiac further argued that it 
could not be held “responsible for the disparity in light of fluctuations in  
                                                 
339. Id. 
340. Id. (quoting Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 101 (D. Conn. 2010)). 
341. Id. 
342. Id. (quoting Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 101). 
343. Id. 
344. Id. at 105–06. 
345. Id. at 106. 
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enrollment.”346  Finally, “Quinnipiac contend[ed] that the district court  
erroneously accorded dispositive weight to the fact that the number of additional 
female roster spots needed to achieve exact proportionality—[thirty-eight]—
would have been sufficient for Quinnipiac to field an additional varsity team.”347 
The Second Circuit rejected all of Quinnipiac’s contentions.348  First, the 
court found the relatively small percentage of the disparity unimportant.349  
While the district court conceded that the disparity represented “in strictly  
numerical terms . . . a borderline case of disproportionate athletic opportunities,” 
the 1996 Clarification made clear that “substantial proportionality is not  
determined by any bright-line statistical test.”350  Although no other reported 
decision found such a small disparity to constitute a lack of substantial  
proportionality, “the 1996 Clarification . . . [did not] create a statistical safe  
harbor at [any] . . . percentage,” but “instruct[ed] that substantial proportionality 
is properly determined on a ‘case-by-case basis’ after a careful assessment of 
the school’s ‘specific circumstances,’ including the causes of the disparity and 
the reasonableness of requiring the school to add additional athletic  
opportunities to eliminate the disparity.”351  Analyzing precisely these factors, 
“the district court pointed to record evidence showing that the 3.62% identified 
disparity was almost entirely attributable to Quinnipiac’s own careful control of 
its athletic rosters,” and its conclusion should be upheld.352 
Finally, the Second Circuit did not interpret the district court’s decision to 
categorically hold that “no matter how small a disparity, if it can be closed by 
the creation of a new sports team, a school will be found not to have afforded 
substantially proportionate athletic opportunities.”353  Rather, the district court 
“discussed the possible creation of a new sports team only to explain why it was 
reasonable to expect Quinnipiac to add additional athletic opportunities for 
women to close the identified 3.62% disparity.”354  Because the gap  
reflected thirty-eight positions, and all of Quinnipiac’s currently existing 
women’s sports teams had rosters of less than thirty participants, it was  
“certain that [a new] sports team could be created from the shortfall.”355   





350. Id. (quoting Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 111). 
351. Id.  
352. Id. at 107. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. 
355. Id. (quoting Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 112). 
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Indeed, it would take “little effort . . . to afford the additional participation  
opportunities of an independent sports team,” because such a team already  
existed in the form of the women’s volleyball team the school was trying to 
eliminate.356 
Based on all of the above reasons, the Second Circuit rejected  
Quinnipiac’s contentions on appeal and affirmed the injunction “substantially 
for the reasons stated by the district court in its comprehensive and well  
reasoned [sic] opinion.”357 
C. The 2013 District Court Opinion 
Following the Second Circuit’s affirmance, Quinnipiac subsequently 
moved to lift the district court’s injunction, claiming that changes to its  
athletics program over the past two years brought it into compliance with Title 
IX.358  Specifically, Quinnipiac emphasized the following changes: 
 
(1) [T]he addition of a varsity women’s golf team; (2) the  
further cultivation of competitive cheer as a developing sport, 
having renamed the activity “acrobatics and tumbling”; (3) the 
addition of a varsity women’s rugby team; and (4) the  
adoption of a written policy that no student athlete would be 
required to join additional teams in order to participate in her 
sport of choice—or more specifically, that women’s  
cross-country athletes would no longer be required to  
participate in women’s indoor and outdoor track.359 
 
Quinnipiac asserted that women’s golf, competitive cheer, rugby, and track 
“provide[d] female athletes with genuine varsity participation opportunities,” 
and, when these participation opportunities were combined with the school’s 
other participation opportunities, as to which there was no dispute, the school 
allocated female athletic participation opportunities in numbers substantially 
proportionate to its female undergraduate enrollment, in compliance with the 
first prong of the three-prong test.360 
The court quickly determined that as a full-fledged NCAA championship 
                                                 
356. Id. 
357. Id. at 91. 
358. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 419 (D. Conn. 2013). 
359. Id. at 420. 
360. Id. at 453. 
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sport, women’s golf provided genuine athletic participation opportunities and 
counted the golf team’s eleven athletes in its tally.361  The court also decided to 
count all but three multisport cross-country athletes who regularly participated 
in practice sessions and other team activities, even if they were injured and did 
not actually compete in meets.362  Therefore, the bulk of the court’s lengthy 
opinion consisted of discussion and analysis related to whether competitive 
cheer and rugby athletes could be counted as genuine participation opportunities 
for purposes of Title IX compliance. 
After retracing the development of the relevant Title IX regulations and 
guidelines, the court reaffirmed the analytical framework it used in its earlier 
opinion.  Because Quinnipiac again proceeded solely under the substantial  
proportionality prong of the three-part test, the court’s analysis proceeded in 
two steps.  First, the court determined the number of genuine varsity athletic 
participation opportunities afforded to members of each sex.363  Then, it  
calculated “whether the number of participation opportunities is substantially 
proportionate to the gender demographics of the university.”364 
1. Whether an Activity Constitutes a “Sport” 
As to the first step of the analysis, the court determined which  
participation opportunities should be counted by focusing on the factors  
delineated in the 2008 OCR Letter,365 just as it had in its previous decision:   
 
Under prong one [of the Three-Part Test], the term  
“participation opportunities” means the total number of  
“participants”—as defined in the 1996 Clarification—engaged 
in genuine intercollegiate-level varsity “sports.”  Whether a 
particular athletic activity qualifies as a “sport” (so that  
“participants” in that activity may count for purposes of prong 
one) depends on both intrinsic and extrinsic factors, as  
outlined in the 2008 OCR Letter.  Intrinsic factors concern the 
inherent sport-like qualities of the activity, such as (1) whether 
the purpose of the activity is athletic competition; (2) whether 
                                                 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 465.  The three athletes the court decided not to count quit the indoor track team less than  
halfway through the season, without competing in a single event, and so could not be found to have  
participated in the activity on a regular basis.  Id. at 466. 
363. Id. at 440. 
364. Id. 
365. Consistent with its earlier decision, the court continued to accord the 1996 Clarification and 
2000 and 2008 OCR Letters substantial deference.  See id. at 445–46. 
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competition is judged by a set of rules and objective criteria; 
(3) whether participants are selected on the basis of athletic 
ability; (4) whether the number of competitions and length of 
play are determined by a governing athletics organization; (5) 
whether the activity has a defined season; and (6) whether post-
season competition, if available, is dependent on regular season 
results.  Extrinsic factors, in contrast, concern how the putative 
sport is administered by the university, including (1) whether 
the budget, support services, and coaching are provided in a  
manner consistent with established varsity sports; (2) whether 
participants are eligible for scholarships and awards; (3) 
whether participants are recruited in a manner consistent with 
other varsity sports; (4) whether practice opportunities are  
consistent with other varsity sports; (5) whether competitive 
opportunities differ quantitatively or qualitatively from  
established varsity sports, including competition against other 
varsity opponents; (6) whether the competitive schedule  
reflects the abilities of the team; (7) whether the team  
participates in pre-season or post-season competition in a  
manner consistent with other varsity sports; and (8) whether  
resources for the activity are based on the competitive needs of 
the team.  Intrinsic factors bear on whether an activity is  
capable of providing athletes a genuine varsity participation 
opportunity, while extrinsic factors bear on whether a  
particular school’s program is organized and administered in a 
way that actually provides athletes a genuine varsity  
participation opportunity.  Accordingly, even if an athletic  
activity possesses, in the abstract, all of the intrinsic attributes 
of an authentic “sport,” it may nonetheless be offered in such a 
manner that its participants do not receive a genuine varsity  
experience on par with other bona fide varsity athletes; that is, 
the activity, as administered, lacks the extrinsic attributes of an 
intercollegiate varsity sport.366 
a. Competitive Cheer.   
Turning first to competitive cheer, or “acro,” as Quinnipiac now calls it,367 
                                                 
366. Id. at 444. 
367. “Acro” is short for “acrobatics and tumbling.”  Id. at 420. 
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the court assumed that the activity continued to satisfy all of the factors it found 
satisfied in its previous opinion.368  The team’s “budget, benefits and services, 
coaching staff, scholarships and awards, and practice opportunities were all  
provided in a manner consistent with established varsity sports.”369  Moreover, 
the team’s purpose was “to compete athletically at the intercollegiate level, and 
. . . its members were selected for—and remain dedicated to—that purpose.”370  
The issue facing the court was whether the further development and changes 
implemented in the program subsequent to its 2010 decision were sufficient to 
justify a finding that the acro team now constituted a sport whose team members 
could be counted as participants for purposes of Title IX.371 
i. Lack of NCAA Recognition.   
An initial problem for Quinnipiac was the fact that neither competitive cheer 
nor acro was recognized as a championship sport by the NCAA, or even as an 
emerging sport.372  Indeed, the recent efforts by the National Collegiate  
Acrobatics and Tumbling Association (NCATA), the new name of the former 
NCSTA,373 to obtain NCAA recognition for acro as an emerging sport proved 
fruitless.374  The initial emerging-sport proposal put forward by the NCATA in 
2010 ignited a schism within the competitive cheer community, based on  
diverging visions for the activity.375  While the NCATA’s proposed format  
emphasized the gymnastic elements of cheer, another faction, led by USA 
Cheer, the national governing body for cheerleading, submitted an emerging 
sport proposal of its own, based on a “rival format called ‘STUNT,’ which 
place[d] greater emphasis on the performance-based aspects of traditional 
cheerleading competitions.”376  Faced with competing proposals, the NCAA 
Committee for Women’s Athletics (CWA), the organization responsible for  
                                                 
368. Id. at 454. 
369. Id.; see also id. at 422 n.9. 
370. Id. at 455. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. at 421, 423.  As discussed, an emerging sport is “a provisional designation that allows a 
university to count the activity toward NCAA revenue distribution and minimum sports sponsorship 
requirements.” Id. at 421; see also supra note 251.  This designation “encourage[s] schools to increase 
sports opportunities and create NCAA championships in these new sports.”  Hogshead-Makar, supra 
note 228, at 469.  As of the 2015–2016 season, acro is still not listed as an emerging sport.  See NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 251, art. 20.02.4(a)–(b). 
373. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 423. 
374. Id. at 424. 
375. Id. 
376. Id.; see also Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 457.  For a detailed discussion of the differences  
between the two proposals, see Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 456–58. 
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determining whether an activity receives provisional recognition as an  
emerging sport, held both proposals in abeyance and instructed the two rival 
organizations to resolve their differences.377  Unfortunately, the NCATA and 
USA Cheer were unable to reach agreement and once again submitted  
competing proposals to the CWA in 2011.378 
Due to this discord, the court believed that “acro’s prospects of qualifying 
as an NCAA emerging sport in the foreseeable future have dimmed  
considerably since 2010.”379  The rivalry between NCATA and USA Cheer 
“means that the structure of this nascent sport will remain in flux, as some 
schools adopt one format while others adopt the competing format.”380  This 
was particularly problematic because at least twenty schools must offer varsity 
or competitive club teams in the activity before it can be recognized as an 
emerging sport.381  Due to competition from USA Cheer, only six universities 
sponsored acro teams during the 2011–2012 season, too few to support acro as 
an emerging sport.382  For 2012–2013, one of those six schools decided to  
cancel its acro team, while two others planned to sponsor acro teams.383  Even 
for the 2013–2014 season, only three additional schools provided letters of  
commitment, bringing the total to, at most, ten participating schools.384 
Not only had the NCAA failed to classify competitive cheer or acro as  
either a championship or emerging sport, but DOE did not recognize it as a sport 
either, meaning schools reporting their athletic participation data under the 
EADA could not report their rosters “unless they have received a letter from the 
[OCR] determining that their cheer squads are legitimately engaged in sport.”385  
And, of course, “[t]o date, the agency has never issued a letter counting  
cheerleading or acro as a varsity sport.”386 
                                                 




381. Id.; see Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 456.  There must also “be other evidence of potential interest 
in a college-level competition.”  Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 456 (citing CRITERIA FOR EMERGING 
SPORTS, supra note 133).  Such evidence may take the form of “high participation rates in college 
intramurals, high school teams, or non-scholastic competitive teams, and support from governing  
bodies, conferences, the U.S. Olympic Committee, and professional organizations.”  Id. (citing 
CRITERIA FOR EMERGING SPORTS, supra note 133). 
382. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 424–25.  By contrast, fifteen collegiate club teams agreed to 
compete under the auspices of the USA Cheer format.  Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 457. 
383. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 425. 
384. Id. 
385. Id. at 421–22. 
386. Id. at 422.  Quinnipiac decided not to seek such a letter following an earlier letter from OCR 
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In sum, acro was still not entitled to a presumption that it should be  
considered a sport because it was still not recognized by the NCAA as a  
championship sport or an emerging sport.387  Thus, Quinnipiac had the burden 
of proving that acro satisfied the factors listed in the 2008 OCR Letter.388  Not 
only did it have this burden, but Quinnipiac also had to overcome OCR’s  
presumption against treating cheer-based activities as a sport under Title IX, as 
established by the 2000 OCR Letters.389  The school’s failure to overcome this 
presumption constituted a significant hurdle to its claim that acro should be  
considered a sport. 
Before even turning to the other factors, the court found the lack of  
recognition as a sport by the NCAA and OCR alone was “sufficient to tip the 
balance against treating an athletic endeavor as an authentic varsity ‘sport’ for 
purposes of prong one.”390  Without such recognition, “acro lacks what every 
other varsity men’s team sponsored by Quinnipiac enjoys: the chance to  
participate in an NCAA-sponsored championship.”391  And where 
 
a school chooses to sponsor an athletics program at the  
highest level of competition (NCAA Division I), and offers all 
of its male athletes the opportunity to participate in  
NCAA-championship sports, the lack of NCAA recognition for 
a single women’s sport within that program raises a significant 
gender-equity issue if the school hopes to count that  
unreconized sport toward compliance with Title IX.  So long as 
Quinnipiac chooses to hold itself out as a Division I  
institution, providing a full slate of NCAA-recognized sports 
for men, equity demands that it do the same for women.392 
 
This was due to the fact that, as the plaintiff’s expert testified, “the  
experience NCAA championships provide is considered ‘the top of the  
mountain’ by student athletes, and championships sponsored ‘by other  
                                                 
to the athletic director of the University of Maryland, expressing skepticism as to whether competitive 
cheer satisfied several factors necessary to be counted toward Title IX compliance.  See Letter from 
Linda C. Barrett, Team Leader, Office for Civil Rights, to Deborah A. Yow, Dir. of Athletics, Univ. of 
Md. (May 8, 2003) (on file with Author). 
387. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
388. Id. 
389. Id. 
390. Id. at 455. 
391. Id. at 423–24. 
392. Id. at 455. 
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organizations don’t have the same financial resources, and the quality of  
experience is not the same.’”393 
Moreover, the CWA—“the undisputed authority on intercollegiate sports 
for women, and the source from which the OCR’s presumption in favor of  
recognized emerging sports arises”—specifically reviewed the competing 
emerging sport proposals and determined that the competing organizations must 
first settle their differences before recognition as an emerging sport could be 
given.394  Thus, the CWA effectively determined that acro was not yet ready “to 
be recognized on its own as an emerging sport, at least until the internal  
divisions within the former competitive-cheer community are resolved.”395  “So 
long as acknowledged authorities in intercollegiate athletics decline to  
recognize acro as an authentic varsity sport, courts should hesitate before doing 
otherwise.”396  “For this reason alone,” the court concluded that Quinnipiac had 
not overcome the presumption against treating acro as a sport for purposes of 
Title IX.397 
ii.  Intrinsic Factors.   
Notwithstanding the lack of recognition as a sport by the NCAA and OCR, 
the court also held that Quinnipiac continued to run afoul of the same factors set 
forth in the 2008 OCR Letter that proved fatal to its argument back in 2010.398  
Among the intrinsic factors identified by OCR as relevant to finding that an 
activity constitutes a sport, the court previously identified the shortcomings of 
the competitive cheer team related to areas  
 
fundamental to intercollegiate varsity sports, such as: whether 
competition is judged by a consistent set of rules; whether the 
number of competitions and length of play are determined by a 
governing athletics organization; whether the activity has a  
defined season; and whether post-season competition is  
dependent on regular season results.399   
 
Quinnipiac argued that as a result of the changes it made to correct the  
                                                 
393. Id. at 424. 
394. Id. at 455. 
395. Id. at 455–56. 
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deficiencies identified by the court, its competitive cheer or acro program should 
now be considered a sport.400 
The court acknowledged that the team’s regular season benefited “from 
more consistency in the rules of play and the quality of opponents.”401  After 
changing its name, the NCATA “developed into a more cohesive governing 
body with its own set of bylaws, rules, and policies.”402  It partnered with USA 
Gymnastics, which now sanctions all NCATA competitions.403  As a result, all 
of the acro team’s meets during the 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 seasons were 
governed by a consistent set of rules and the team “competed solely against 
college-level varsity opponents.”404 
The opportunity for a genuine postseason championship also improved for 
the acro team.  Beginning with the 2010–2011 season, the team participated in 
a progressive-style championship, sponsored by NCATA, under the same rules 
that governed its regular season play.405  Moreover, teams were seeded based on 
their regular season results.406 
However, “despite these incremental improvements in structure,  
administration, and scheduling,” the court found that “crucial elements of  
Quinnipiac’s acro program remain unchanged and continue to distinguish the 
team from other Division I varsity sports.”407  First, the ongoing rift between the 
                                                 
400. Id. at 422. 
401. Id. at 423. 
402. Id. 
403. Id.  In conjunction with this partnership, NCATA “solidified some key features of its sport 
including size of squads (no more tha[n] forty), number of regular season competitions (six to eight), 
meet format (six rounds—compulsory, stunt, pyramid, basket toss, tumbling, and a team routine), and 
scoring (pre-determined start difficulty values for each skill in each round).”  Buzuvis, supra note 13, 
at 457 (citing NCATA: NCSTA Will Sanction Events Through USA Gymnastics, SPIRIT CO. (Sept. 2, 
2010), http://spiritcompany.com/2010/09/ncata-ncsta-will-sanction-events-through-usa-gymnastics/).  
The result was “a new, competitive discipline that is separate from sideline cheerleading and focused 
on competition based on accuracy and synchronous execution of physical skills,” with “a competitive 
structure that is far more extensive and more tailored to the competitive purpose of sport than” what 
previously existed.  Id. at 458. 
404. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 423.  In the 2010–2011 season, Quinnipiac’s acro team competed 
in six competitions and a national championship.  Id. at 423 n.12.  In the 2011–2012 season, the team 
competed in ten competitions and a national championship.  Id.  The team thus participated in more 
competitions per season than had been the case at the time of the district court’s 2010 decision.  See 
Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 460. 
405. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 423; see also Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 456–57.  These rules are  
“designed to compare each team’s technical and synchronous execution of stunts and maneuvers along  
objective, predetermined criteria,” rather than “‘crowd response’ and incorporation of spirit props.”  
Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 460. 
406. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 423; Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 460. 
407. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 423. 
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NCATA and USA Cheer meant that “the rules, competitive format, and  
structure” of the activity remained in flux, “as some teams gravitate toward one 
iteration of the sport while others gravitate toward competing iterations.”408   
Until consensus could be reached between the two formats, “acro’s format will 
be subject to modification,” and no other varsity sport at Quinnipiac “risks  
training under a competitive format that is subject to change as rival factions 
battle over how the sport ultimately will be defined.”409 
Furthermore, while the NCATA national championship seeded teams based 
on their regular season results, “due to the extraordinarily small number of 
schools sponsoring acro, the NCATA’s national championship remains open to 
each and every acro team in the country.”410  There was “no progressive playoff 
system or entrance qualification, such as a minimum win tally over the course 
of [a] season.”411  Nor did such a playoff system seem feasible in the foreseeable 
future.412  No other varsity sport at Quinnipiac received “an automatic bid to 
nationals; a free pass that dilutes the experience compared to legitimate  
post-season competition.”413  Accordingly, despite certain improvements, the 
intrinsic factors counseling against a determination that competitive cheer or 
acro constituted a sport in 2010 continued to weigh against such a finding in 
2012. 
iii. Extrinsic Factors.   
The extrinsic factors identified by the court in its original decision related 
to “whether an athletic activity is administered by the university in manner [sic] 
consistent with bona fide varsity sports” and included 
 
whether participants are recruited in a manner consistent with 
other varsity sports; whether competitive opportunities differ 
quantitatively or qualitatively from established varsity sports; 
whether the competitive schedule reflects the abilities of the 
team; and whether the team participates in pre-season or  
post-season competition in a manner consistent with other  
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varsity sports.414 
 
The court conceded that the acro team “has seen discernible improvements 
with respect to each of these factors” and “Quinnipiac has come closer to  
meeting its burden of proof.”415  The team’s head coach began off-campus  
recruiting in June 2010 and tailored her recruitment efforts to NCAA  
standards.416  Further, the team competed exclusively against collegiate varsity 
opponents over the past two seasons.417  Ultimately, however, despite these  
improvements, the acro program still fell short in certain particulars.418 
First, while the head coach of the acro program could now recruit off  
campus, her recruitment strategies differed from those of every other varsity 
team at Quinnipiac.419  She “could not recruit athletes based on their mastery of 
acro’s specific competitive format, because no high school in the country  
currently sponsors an acro program of its own.”420  The coach, therefore, was 
forced to seek out athletes “with a patchwork of skill sets derived from diverse 
athletic backgrounds, including cheerleading, gymnastics, acrobatics and other 
sports,”421 in the hopes that “skills honed in those sports would be transferable 
to acro.”422  Because none of these athletes had ever competed in the sport of 
acro, unlike the coaches of every other varsity team at Quinnipiac, the acro 
coach “could only know by inference and guesswork what other coaches knew 
for sure: whether a particular athlete competes effectively in the sport for which 
she is being recruited.”423  Thus, “recruitment for acro differed both  
quantitatively and qualitatively from every other varsity sport in the  
University’s athletics program.”424 
Furthermore, while the team competed exclusively against collegiate  
varsity competition, “there are still far too few acro programs in existence to 
provide genuine intercollegiate competition on the varsity level.”425  This  
                                                 
414. Id. at 457. 
415. Id. at 456–57. 
416. Id. at 422–23. 
417. Id. at 425, 457. 
418. Id. at 457. 
419. Id. at 425, 457. 
420. Id. at 457. 
421. Id. at 425. 
422. Id. at 457. 
423. Id.  
424. Id. 
425. Id. 
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resulted in “significant variation in the declared division level among those  
opponents.”426  During the 2011–2012 season, for example, there were only six 
acro teams nationwide.427  No other varsity team at Quinnipiac played “such a 
tiny universe of opponents.”428  Of those five opponents, only three were  
members of NCAA Division I, while one belonged to NCAA Division II, and 
one belonged to the NAIA.429  Indeed, of the acro team’s ten regular  
season competitions during the 2011–2012 season, only six involved fellow 
NCAA Division I members, meaning that “forty percent of [its] regular season 
meets were against teams below [its] declared division level.”430  Not one of 
Quinnipiac’s men’s teams played a single regular-season contest against a  
below-division opponent that year.431 
In sum, the changes Quinnipiac implemented in connection with its  
competitive cheer or acro team were not enough to overcome the presumption 
against treating the activity as a sport.432  Based on “the lack of recognition by 
the NCAA, the ongoing rivalry with [USA Cheer], the sport’s unconventional 
recruiting difficulties, and the team’s inadequate regular-season and  
post-season competition,” Quinnipiac’s acro team still could not be considered 
a varsity sport for purposes of Title IX.433 
b. Women’s Rugby.   
Having reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that competitive cheerleading or 
acro did not constitute a sport for purposes of Title IX, the court next turned its 
attention to Quinnipiac’s newly developed women’s rugby team, which, it  
believed, “present[ed] a closer question.”434  Although Quinnipiac only began 
                                                 
426. Id. at 425. 
427. Id. at 457. 
428. Id. 
429. Id. at 425.  The NAIA school Azusa Pacific University has since reclassified to NCAA Division 
II.  Joe Reinsch, Azusa Pacific Recommended for Full NCAA Division II Membership, AZUSA PAC. 
ATHLETICS (July 11, 2014), http://www.apu.edu/athletics/stories/22124. 
430. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 425, 457. 
431. Id. 
432. Id. at 455. 
433. Id. at 458.  The court, however, was careful to note that, because Quinnipiac chose to rely 
exclusively on the substantial proportionality prong of the three-prong test, its decision that competitive 
cheerleading or acro did not count toward compliance with Title IX was confined to that prong—“the 
only prong in which an assessment of substantial proportionality in ‘intercollegiate level participation 
opportunities’ is required.”  Id. at 458.  The court refused to foreclose the possibility that, “under  
different circumstances, a university’s sponsorship of a varsity-level acro program could count toward 
compliance under prongs two or three.”  Id.   
434. Id. 
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sponsoring women’s rugby for the 2011–2012 season, the sport of rugby itself 
has been played for at least 175 years.435  Indeed, rugby is recognized by the 
NCAA as an emerging sport, which means that it is subject to many of the same 
structural and administrative requirements as NCAA championship sports, may 
be counted by sponsoring schools “toward membership minimums and revenue 
distribution under NCAA regulations[,]” and is entitled to a presumption that it 
provides its athletes the opportunity to participate in an intercollegiate varsity 
sport for purposes of Title IX.436 
At the same time, however, the court noted various considerations  
supporting a conclusion that the presumption afforded to rugby as an emerging 
sport should not be given much weight.437  Pursuant to NCAA rules, an  
emerging sport may lose its status “if, after a period of ten years, it fails to add 
enough varsity teams to make adequate progress toward promotion to  
NCAA-championship status.”438  At that time, rugby was on the list of  
emerging sports for ten years, and only five schools, including Quinnipiac, 
sponsored it as a varsity sport.439  Based on the low number of schools  
sponsoring varsity women’s rugby—far fewer than the number of schools  
sponsoring other emerging sports, that had been stripped of their status in the 
past for lack of growth440—“rugby risks losing recognition as an emerging sport 
in the very near future.”441  Due to its precarious position, the court  
believed that the presumption afforded under the 2008 OCR Letter by NCAA 
recognition “[wa]s weakened in this case; rugby may be recognized today, but 
not tomorrow.”442  Accordingly, “under the unique circumstances of this case, 
the presumption in favor of counting Quinnipiac’s rugby program for Title IX 
purposes [wa]s entitled to considerably less weight.”443  The court then turned 
its sights to whether this weak presumption was effectively rebutted, based on 
the intrinsic and extrinsic factors set forth in the 2008 OCR Letter.444 
                                                 
435. Id. at 425. 
436. Id. at 426, 458–59. 
437. Id. at 426–27. 
438. Id. at 426–27. 
439. Id. at 427.  Moreover, of those five schools, Quinnipiac was the only one to add rugby since it 
was granted emerging sport status.  Id. 
440. Women’s squash was stripped of emerging sport status when, after ten years, only forty-eight 
schools sponsored a varsity team, while synchronized swimming lost its status with eleven  
school-sponsored teams, badminton with fifteen teams, and archery with eight.  Id. at 427 n.18. 
441. Id. at 459.  Despite the court’s misgivings, rugby is still listed as an emerging sport as of the  
2015–2016 academic year.  See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 251, art. 20.02.4(a). 
442. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
443. Id. 
444. Id. at 458. 
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i. Intrinsic Factors.   
The court believed that the various intrinsic factors favored a finding that 
women’s rugby constituted a sport for Title IX purposes.445  Rugby had been 
played in its current form for over a century and “plainly possesses the intrinsic  
qualities of an authentic sport.”446  “Without a doubt, rugby’s purpose is  
athletic competition, its contests are governed by a uniform set of rules, its  
players are selected for their ruthless athleticism, and its competitive season and 
length of play are all well settled.”447  A national governing body—USA 
Rugby—“sponsor[ed] an annual post-season tournament in which member 
teams compete[d] based on their regular-season results.”448  Even “plaintiffs 
concede[d] that rugby is unquestionably [a] ‘sport,’ and . . . capable of providing 
genuine athletic participation opportunities.”449  The issue, however, was not 
merely whether Quinnipiac’s women’s rugby team was “capable of providing 
 . . . genuine [athletic] participation opportunit[ies]” in the context of a sport, 
but whether the school administered the program as an intercollegiate-level 
sport on par with its other varsity sports teams and conducted it in a manner that 
satisfied the various extrinsic factors set forth in the 2008 OCR Letter.450 
ii. Extrinsic Factors.   
Certain extrinsic factors also supported a finding that Quinnipiac’s  
women’s rugby team provided genuine intercollegiate-level athletic  
participation opportunities within the context of a sport for purposes of Title IX.  
The team received “many of the same benefits that established varsity teams 
receive, such as professional coaching, support services, practice  
opportunities, scholarships and awards, and an annual budget tailored to the 
needs of the team.”451  Also, the head coach of the women’s rugby team was 
qualified to recruit off campus from an early stage.452  Notwithstanding these 
findings, however, the court concluded that the Quinnipiac women’s rugby team 
“lacked [other] extrinsic qualities required to provide its . . . athletes with  
participation opportunities on par with other [NCAA] Division I . . . sports.”453 
                                                 
445. Id. at 457–58. 






452. Id. at 426. 
453. Id. at 459.  
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Of greatest concern to the court were various factors related to team  
competition, including  
 
(1) whether competitive opportunities differ quantitatively or 
qualitatively from established varsity sports, including 
“whether the team competes against intercollegiate or  
interscholastic varsity opponents in a manner consistent with 
established varsity sports”; and (2) whether the activity  
provides an opportunity for athletes to participate in pre-season 
or post-season competition in a manner consistent with other 
varsity sports, including “whether state, national and/or confer-
ence championships exist for the activity.”454 
 
The court determined that the Quinnipiac women’s rugby team fell short on 
both the listed factors.455 
The court first found that “rugby’s competitive schedule differed both  
quantitatively and qualitatively from other varsity sports.”456  Every other  
varsity team at Quinnipiac—even the acro team—played a full schedule of  
varsity competition.457  However, only four other colleges in the country  
sponsored varsity women’s rugby teams.458  Therefore, of the ten regular  
season contests on Quinnipiac’s schedule for the 2011–2012 season, six were 
against non-varsity club teams and only four were against varsity  
opponents.459  Moreover, of the four other varsity programs Quinnipiac  
competed against, only one (Eastern Illinois University) was a member of 
NCAA Division I.460  Thus, even if Quinnipiac played a full varsity schedule, 
there was a single competitor in the entire country at its same division level.461  
                                                 
454. Id. at 460 (quoting Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 100–01 (D. Conn. 2010)); 
Monroe, supra note 14.  
455. Id. at 461. 
456. Id. at 460. 
457. Id. 
458. Id. at 426. 
459. Id. at 426, 460.  “[C]lub teams [generally] operate at a lower level of competition and receive 
less institutional support than do varsity teams.”  Id. at 426.  They “typically receive little or no funding 
from a school’s athletic program, and must seek out alternative sources of support from student  
government or recreation departments to supply coaching, equipment, and training.”  Id. 
460. Id.  One other school (West Chester University) was a member of NCAA Division II, while 
the remaining two schools (Bowdoin College and Norwich University) were members of NCAA  
Division III.  Id. at 426 n.16. 
461. Id. at 460 n.51. 
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The court deemed “[s]uch diminished competitive opportunity . . . inconsistent 
with a varsity program at an NCAA Division I institution.”462  Thus, for  
purposes of this factor, “Quinnipiac’s rugby team does not presently provide 
female athletes with genuine ‘intercollegiate level participation opportunities,’ 
equivalent to other Division I varsity teams,” and “[t]hat will not change until, 
at the very minimum, a majority of its competitions are scheduled against  
varsity-level opponents.”463  So long as Quinnipiac offers every other varsity 
team a full schedule of varsity competition, “it must do substantially the same 
for rugby—at least if it hopes to count its rugby program toward compliance 
with prong one.”464 
The court also found that the rugby team lacked the opportunity to play in 
any postseason competition during the 2011–2012 season, “let alone  
participate “in a manner consistent with established varsity sports.”465  First, no 
other school in Quinnipiac’s conference466 sponsored a women’s rugby team, so 
it had to compete “in a separate regional league known as the Metropolitan New 
York Rugby Football Union (“Metro NY”), which operate[d] under the auspices 
of USA Rugby.”467  Every other team competing in Metro NY was a collegiate 
club program.468  Even within this regional league, Quinnipiac “could not avail 
itself of [any] post-season opportunities.”469  First, an ice storm forced  
cancellation of the Metro NY regional playoffs, which were not rescheduled.470  
Second, notwithstanding the ice storm, Quinnipiac already decided to skip the 
regional playoffs, due to a scheduling conflict with two varsity opponents and 
safety concerns regarding the potential of having to play matches on three 
                                                 
462. Id. at 460. 
463. Id. at 461. 
464. Id. 
465. Id. (quoting Monroe, supra note 14).  
466. At the time of the court’s decision, all of Quinnipiac’s other varsity teams, with the exception 
of acro, competed in the Northeast Conference (“NEC”).  Id. at 427.  Beginning with the 2013–2014 
academic year, Quinnipiac’s sports teams began competing in the Metro Atlantic Athletic Conference.  
Quinnipiac University Joins the MAAC, MAACSPORTS (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://www.maacsports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=205825230. 
467. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 427; see also id. at 461.  Beginning with the 2012–2013 season, 
the rugby team would compete in the Tri-State Conference, still under the auspices of USA Rugby.  Id. 
at 427 n.19.   
468. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 427. 
469. Id. at 461.  “USA Rugby sponsor[ed] its own national collegiate championship.”  Id. at 427.  
A team had to win its regional playoffs, and then its conference championship, to qualify for the national  
tournament.  Id.  
470. Id. at 427, 461.  Metro NY simply sent its highest ranked team, which was not Quinnipiac, to 
the conference tournament.  Id. at 427–28. 
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straight days.471 
Based on these findings, the court felt compelled to conclude that, “[i]f 
Quinnipiac is serious about sponsoring women’s rugby as a Division I varsity 
sport, it should not tolerate its team competing in a region in which  
post-season championships are, in the Coach’s estimation, too dangerous to 
win.”472  On top of this, even if the team participated in the postseason  
tournaments, its competition would consist entirely of club teams.473  The only 
point at which it might encounter another varsity team would be in the national 
championship itself, assuming that one of the other four varsity programs also 
managed to qualify.474  Accordingly, “rugby is unlike any other established  
varsity team at Quinnipiac: all other teams—with the exception of acro— 
compete in NEC and NCAA-sponsored tournaments against a full slate of  
varsity competitors.”475 
In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the  
2011–2012 season, the court concluded that “Quinnipiac should not be  
permitted to count its nascent rugby program among the University’s  
intercollegiate-level varsity sports for purposes of prong one.”476  While there 
was no question that rugby had all the intrinsic qualities of a sport, “the  
manner in which Quinnipiac’s rugby program was administered in its inaugural 
season ultimately deprived female participants of the competitive opportunities 
essential to a genuine varsity experience.”477  Specifically,  
 
[T]he rugby team’s majority club competition in the regular 
season, the absence of any potential varsity competition in the 
regional and/or conference post-season, and the team’s  
inability to compete for a regional, conference, or national 
championship due to safety concerns with the regional  
tournament’s current format are sufficient, in the aggregate, to 
overcome the presumption in favor of counting rugby’s  
                                                 
471. Id. at 428, 461.  While the team could conceivably avoid any scheduling conflicts in the future, 
the court found that the safety concerns “effectively foreclose[] any chance of the team competing for 




474. Id. at 461–62. 
475. Id. at 462. 
476. Id. 
477. Id. 
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participants for Title IX purposes.478 
2. Substantial Proportionality 
Once all of the participation opportunities are counted, the next step is to 
determine whether athletic opportunities at the school are substantially  
proportionate to the percentages of male and female undergraduate enrollment 
at the school.  For the 2011–2012 academic year, Quinnipiac “had an  
undergraduate enrollment of 5,988 students, of which 2,253 (or 37.6%) were 
male, and 3,735 (or 62.4%) were female.”479  Based on its own figures,  
Quinnipiac asserted that it had 489 total athletes, of which 168, or 34.4%, were 
male, and 321, or 65.6%, were female.480  If these numbers were accurate, not 
only would Quinnipiac’s athletic participation rates be substantially  
proportional, but they would be slightly over-weighted in favor of females.481 
However, the court’s determination that neither acro nor women’s rugby 
provided genuine athletic participation opportunities meant that none of the 
members of those teams could be included in the tally.482  This resulted in the 
removal of sixty-seven female athletes from Quinnipiac’s count, leaving it with 
only 254 female athletes.483  Using these figures, only 60.2% of  
Quinnipiac’s athletes were female, while females comprised 62.4% of the 
school’s undergraduate enrollment, a disparity of 2.2%.484 
The court then decided whether the 2.2% disparity was significant enough 
                                                 
478. Id.  Again, however, the court was quick to limit the potential reach of its holding.  See id.  The 
court acknowledged that emerging sports, such as rugby, “by definition, require an incubation period 
in which to grow and develop, and that during that period first-generation varsity teams will inevitably 
spend a portion of their regular seasons competing against club teams to round out their schedules.”  Id.  
However, even if participants in emerging sports under those circumstances could never be counted for 
purposes of prong one (a conclusion the court denied reaching) that does not mean emerging sports 
may never count for anything under Title IX.  Id.  The court deemed it “all but certain that sponsorship 
of emerging sports could count toward compliance under prongs two or three.”  Id.  Quinnipiac, again, 
defended itself only under the substantial proportionality prong (prong one) of the three-prong test.  Id. 
at 463.  Therefore, while the court “conclude[d] that participants in Quinnipiac’s rugby program may 
not be counted for purposes of prong one,” the court’s holding “by no means precludes the possibility 
that, under different procedural circumstances, a school’s sponsorship of women’s rugby would count 
for purposes of prongs two or three.”  Id. 
479. Id. at 431. 
480. Id. 
481. Id.  
482. See id. at 466. 
483. Id. Of the sixty-seven female athletes removed from the tally, thirty-six were members of the 
acro team, twenty-eight were members of the rugby team, and three were indoor track runners who quit 
the team less than half-way through the regular season.  Id. 
484. Id. 
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to take Quinnipiac out of compliance with the substantial proportionality prong.  
Some courts previously found “that a disparity below two percentage points is 
proof that an educational institution falls within the substantial  
proportionality safe harbor,” making a 2.2% disparity a very close case in  
numerical terms.485  However, according to the 1996 Clarification, “raw  
numbers are only part of the analysis for whether the participation of women in 
a school’s varsity program is proportional to enrollment.”486  The court also 
considered “whether natural fluctuations in enrollment contributed to the lack 
of proportionality, and whether the number of athletic participation  
opportunities needed to achieve exact proportionality would be sufficient to  
sustain a viable athletic team.”487 
As to the first consideration, Quinnipiac “introduced no evidence . . . to 
suggest that natural fluctuations in enrollment—or unanticipated drops in  
female athletic participation—were to blame for [the] disparity in athletic  
opportunities.”488  Indeed, the school carefully selected its teams’ roster targets 
and “continued to take steps to ensure that [those] targets were met over the 
course of the year.”489  As to the second consideration, “the 2.2 percent  
disparity represent[ed] a shortfall of . . . twenty-five female athletes,” enough to 
sustain an additional varsity team.490  Indeed, the established women’s  
volleyball team the school was trying to eliminate had a roster of only fourteen 
athletes.491  In sum, the 2.2% disparity demonstrated that Quinnipiac still “failed 
to allocate athletic participation opportunities in numbers substantially  
proportionate to its undergraduate female population,” and had “not yet brought 
itself into compliance with Title IX’s effective-accommodation mandate.”492 
3. The Levels-of-Competition Test 
While many of the issues resolved by the court in connection with its  
analysis of the substantial proportionality prong were novel in their own right, 
the court proceeded to place an additional gloss on its decision, one that few, if 
                                                 
485. Id. at 466–67 (citing Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 682–83 
(W.D. Va. 2009)). 
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any, prior decisions addressed.493  As discussed previously, effective  
accommodation of student interests and abilities under Title IX entails both  
equity in athletic opportunities and equity in levels of competition.494  The  
three-part test determines whether a school met its obligations to provide  
equitable athletic opportunities between genders, while a separate two-part test 
determines whether equity between genders in levels of competition exists.495  
In its 2010 decision, the court concluded that Quinnipiac failed to satisfy the 
first prong of the three-prong test for determining equity in athletic  
opportunities, so it did not have to consider the issue of equity in levels of  
competition.496  Now, however, plaintiffs argued that, even if Quinnipiac was in 
compliance with the three-part test, it independently failed the two-part  
levels-of-competition test.497  Therefore, the court needed to interpret and  
apply this standard as well.498 
To reiterate, the two prongs of the levels of competition test focus on the 
following: 
 
(1)  Whether the competitive schedules for men’s and  
women’s teams, on a program-wide basis, afford proportionally 
similar numbers of male and female athletes equivalently  
advanced competitive opportunities; or 
(2)  Whether the institution can demonstrate a history and  
continuing practice of upgrading the competitive opportunities 
available to the historically disadvantaged sex as warranted by 
developing abilities among the athletes of that sex.499 
 
In the present litigation, Quinnipiac submitted no evidence regarding its  
historical allocation of athletic opportunities under the second prong, meaning 
that its compliance with the levels-of-competition requirement centered solely 
on whether it met the first prong.500  Unfortunately, the court lamented, while 
“the OCR has published multiple letters clarifying the scope and effect of the 
                                                 
493. See id. at 435. 
494. See discussion supra pp. 542–45. 




499. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 
F.2d 824, 829 (10th Cir. 1993); Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 439. 
500. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 439–40. 
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three-part test, and the ‘substantial-proportionality’ prong in  
particular. . . . [T]he same cannot be said of the levels-of-competition test.”501  
OCR provided “almost no additional direction” on the test.502  Indeed, in three 
decades since the Policy Interpretation was promulgated, OCR never, to the 
court’s knowledge, “issued any official policy clarifying the significance of this 
test or how it should be applied.”503  That being said, OCR continued to reiterate 
that effective accommodation must be assessed under both the three-prong test 
and the levels-of-competition test, so the test remained relevant.504  The court 
would have to make do with what little guidance it could find. 
In the absence of official sources providing guidance on the  
levels-of-competition test, the court turned to OCR’s Investigator’s Manual, 
“the only interpretive compass at [its] disposal.”505  The Investigator’s Manual 
is an internal OCR document designed to “assist OCR personnel in conducting 
investigations and compliance reviews in the field.”506  It “was not subject to 
public notice and comment . . . was never formally published. . . . [And] is not 
an official interpretation of either Title IX or the 1979 Policy  
Interpretation.”507  Therefore, the court held that it was “not entitled to the same 
level of deference accorded the [1975] [R]egulations . . . Policy  
Interpretation, or . . . OCR policy letters.”508  It was entitled to respect only to 
the extent of its power to persuade.509  If any inconsistencies existed between 
the Investigator’s Manual and the Policy Interpretation, the Policy Interpretation 
would control.510 
The Investigator’s Manual provided the following methodology for  
assessing compliance with the first prong of the levels-of-competition test: 
                                                 
501. Id. at 440. 
502. Id. at 446. 
503. Id. (emphasis added).  The court suspected that the reason “the levels-of-competition test is 
seldom used today and rarely if ever litigated” had to do with “evolving NCAA standards on  
competitive scheduling among member schools.”  Id.  Currently, “the NCAA imposes strict procedures 
governing the competitive schedules of men’s and women’s NCAA-championship sports, permitting 
only limited competition below declared division levels.”  Id.  Thus, “modern NCAA rules have all but 
eliminated the problem that the levels-of-competition test was designed to address—at least among 
schools that offer both sexes the full panoply of NCAA-championship sports.”  Id. at 446–47.  However, 
“a sizable percentage” of Quinnipiac’s athletic program “include[d] non-NCAA-championship sports,” 
meaning that the levels-of-competition test was back in play.  Id. at 447. 
504. Id. at 446. 





510. Id. at 448. 
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COMPARE the number of competitive events for each team at 
the institution’s declared competitive level.  USE the attached 
chart for this comparison.  DETERMINE the overall  
percentage of men’s and women’s events below the declared 
division level or classification.  If this analysis results in  
relative equivalence, then the second factor [prong two], as  
discussed below, need not be considered.  If there is a  
significant difference in the number of competitive events for 
men and women at the institution’s declared competitive  
level, ASK the appropriate institution for an explanation.  If 
there is any concern that the explanation is not satisfactory, 
consider the second factor.511 
 
The court found persuasive the Investigator’s Manual’s focus on the  
division level of opponents as a proxy for competitive prowess but remained 
unpersuaded by its approach to determine proportional similarity, which it 
found to conflict with the plain language of the Policy Interpretation.512  This 
was due to the Investigator’s Manual’s “proportional comparison of events to 
competition level,” while the levels-of-competition test itself expressly calls for 
a “proportional comparison of athletes to competition level.”513  Because the 
Investigator’s Manual’s approach could not be squared with the express  
language of the Policy Interpretation, the court did not owe it deference.514  The 
court modified the analysis to “compare the percentage of ‘competitive  
opportunities’ afforded to male and female athletes below their declared  
division level,” rather than comparing the number of events.515 
The court’s analysis proceeded in four steps.  First, the court multiplied “the 
number of team ‘events’ against division-level opponents by the number of  
participants on each team involved,” to “calculate the total number of  
‘competitive opportunities’ afforded to the members of each team at their  
declared division level.”516  Second, the court multiplied “the number of team 
‘events’ against non-division-level opponents by the number of participants on 
                                                 
511. Id. (quoting VALERIE BONNETTE & LAMAR DANIEL, TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR’S 
MANUAL 26 (1990)). 
512. Id. 
513. Id. 
514. Id. at 449. 
515. Id. 
516. Id. 
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each team involved,” to “calculate the number of ‘competitive opportunities’ 
below the declared division level.”517  Third, the court “add[ed] up the total 
number of division-level and non-division-level competitive opportunities 
across all teams for each sex,” to “determine what percentage of overall  
competitive opportunities were played against opponents below the school’s  
declared division level” for each sex.518  Finally, the court “compar[ed] the  
overall percentage of below-division-level competitive opportunities for male 
athletes [and] . . . female athletes on a program-wide basis.”519 
After applying this formula, the competitive opportunities for male and  
female athletes needed to be proportionally similar to satisfy the first prong of 
the levels-of-competition test.520  Unfortunately, “[n]either the 1979 Policy  
Interpretation nor the Investigator’s Manual specified a threshold percentage 
that [would] constitute a violation” of this prong.521  The court decided to give 
the proportionally similar phrase “a construction roughly analogous to the 
phrase ‘substantial proportionality,’ as used in the first prong of the three-part 
test.”522  Thus, exact proportionality was not required, and “whether a  
university’s program-wide competitive schedule violates the  
equivalent-competition prong of the levels-of-competition test should be  
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the totality of the  
circumstances.”523 
When it came to applying the test, Quinnipiac asserted “that the  
competitive schedules provided for female athletes are proportionally similar to 
those provided for male athletes, in compliance with the first prong of the  
levels-of-competition test.”524  However, “during the 2011–12 academic year, 
zero percent of the competitive opportunities Quinnipiac provided to male  
athletes were against non-Division I opponents.”525  No men’s team played a 
single game against a lower-division opponent.526  On the other hand, “6.3  
percent of the competitive opportunities Quinnipiac provided to female  
athletes were against non-Division I or non-varsity opponents.”527  This 6.3% 
                                                 




521. Id. at 450. 
522. Id. at 450–51. 
523. Id. at 451. 
524. Id. at 453. 
525. Id. at 469. 
526. Id. 
527. Id. 
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“disparity in equivalently-advanced competitive opportunities for female  
athletes . . . is a direct consequence of the irregular competitive schedule of the 
women’s acro and rugby teams.”528   
While OCR did not specify a threshold percentage that would constitute a 
violation of the first prong of the levels-of-competition test, the court focused 
on two facts.  First, the rugby “schedule not only contained discrepancies in 
division levels among opponents, but discrepancies in their varsity status as 
well.”529  The fact that the majority of a women’s team’s schedule consisted of 
club opponents, while all male athletes were offered a full varsity schedule at 
the highest division level seemed to the court “a particularly egregious  
disparity in opportunity.”530  Moreover, the only two teams competing against 
below-division opponents—acro and rugby—“represent[ed] two of the four 
largest rosters among all women’s teams sponsored” by Quinnipiac.531  This 
meant that “an exceptionally large percentage of female athletes were affected 
by Quinnipiac’s inequitable allocation of competitive opportunities.”532  Based 
on these considerations, the court concluded “that Quinnipiac’s athletic  
program, viewed program-wide, failed to provide proportionally-similar  
numbers of male and female athletes equivalently-advanced competitive  
opportunities in the 2011–2012 academic year.”533  This meant that, even if 
women’s acro and women’s rugby constituted sports providing their members 
genuine athletic participation opportunities, and even if Quinnipiac was in  
compliance with the substantial proportionality prong of the three-part test, 
Quinnipiac’s failure to comply with the first prong of the two-part  
levels-of-competition test meant that it still violated the effective  
accommodation mandate of Title IX.534 
In sum, Quinnipiac’s efforts following the district court’s 2010 decision 
“failed to demonstrate a significant change in the quantity and/or quality of  
athletic participation opportunities provided to its female students.”535  The 
school’s continuing failure to satisfy either the substantial proportionality prong 
of the three-part test or the first prong of the levels-of-competition test required 





532. Id.  “[D]uring the 2011–12 academic year, 20 percent of all [of Quinnipiac’s] female athletes 
had team schedules in which 40 percent or more of their regular-season competitions were against  
non-Division I or non-varsity opponents.”  Id. 
533. Id. at 469–70. 
534. See id. at 467–68, 470–71. 
535. Id. at 473. 
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the district court’s injunction to be kept in place for the foreseeable future.536 
D. Settlement 
Following the district court’s 2013 decision, the parties reached a  
settlement in April 2013.537  As part of the settlement, Quinnipiac agreed to keep 
all of its existing women’s teams, including the volleyball team.538  Quinnipiac 
also agreed to allocate more scholarships to its female athletes and improve the 
benefits provided to its women’s teams.539 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF BIEDIGER 
The Biediger decisions make a substantial contribution to Title IX  
jurisprudence in several novel respects.  The cases provide detailed and  
thorough guidance on several aspects of Title IX that had not received  
significant prior attention from either courts or commentators.  In issuing its 
2010 decision, the district court became the first federal court to apply “OCR’s 
test for whether a sponsored varsity activity can be treated as a sport for  
purposes of Title IX.”540  The district court’s 2013 decision also became the first 
federal court decision to address the seldom used and rarely litigated  
levels-of-competition test.541  Faced with such novel issues, the court  
painstakingly traced the relevant legal background, set forth in detail the  
limited resources it could find that were directly on point, and made logical  
inferences where necessary to apply those resources to the specific facts before 
it, facts that no federal court in a Title IX case had previously encountered.  As 
the Second Circuit found in affirming the district court’s 2010 decision, the 
court’s opinion was “comprehensive and well reasoned [sic].”542 
                                                 
536. Id. at 471–72.  Of course, as part of the injunction, Quinnipiac had to continue sponsoring a 
women’s volleyball team.  Id. at 473. 
537. Settlement Reached in Quinnipiac Title IX Case, NBC CONN., http://www.nbcconnecti-
cut.com/news/local/Settlement-Reached-in-Quinnipiac-Title-IX-Case-204866541.html (last visited 
June 9, 2016). 
538. Id. 
539. Id. 
540. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 94 (D. Conn. 2010); see also Biediger, 928 
F. Supp. 2d at 452 (“[A]part from my previous decision—and the appeal before the Second C 
ircuit—no other court has addressed the OCR’s test for assessing genuine varsity participation  
opportunities, and precious few have interpreted Title IX’s effective-accommodation requirement more  
generally.”). 
541. See Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 446, 452. 
542. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Buzuvis, supra note 13, 
at 452 (“As a Title IX analysis, Judge Underhill’s decision was appropriate and correct.”). 
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A. Assurance that Athletic Participation Opportunities Remain Genuine in 
the Current Economic Climate 
The validity of the Biediger decisions is most readily observed in the  
context of the economic realities currently facing most intercollegiate athletic 
departments.  A recent NCAA study determined that only twenty athletics  
programs at the Football Bowl Subdivision level (the highest level of  
competition within NCAA Division I) turned a profit in 2013.543  A separate 
study of NCAA Division II and III schools “found that revenues failed to  
exceed expenses [for] every [athletic department] on those levels.”544  These 
economic challenges impact Title IX compliance as well.  Faced with growing 
budgetary concerns, schools are more likely to be inclined to cut sports, rather 
than add them.  However, “cutting a viable women’s team necessarily violates 
the second and third prong[s]” of the three-part test under Title IX.545   
Therefore, schools seeking to cut women’s teams would only be able to rely on 
the substantial proportionality prong as a defense to any Title IX claim.546  And 
“schools unable to add or preserve women’s athletic [participation]  
opportunities may be tempted to count women’s opportunities that are  
marginally athletic in order to provide the appearance of proportionality.”547 
The Biediger court believed that Quinnipiac was attempting to take such a 
short cut in its attempts to count competitive cheer or acro and rugby team  
members as female participation opportunities for purposes of the substantial 
proportionality prong.548  The court noted that “Quinnipiac did nothing to  
survey the athletic interests among current or prospective students, but instead 
chose to sponsor acro and rugby for economic or strategic reasons, including 
the sizable rosters of female athletes that both teams could support.”549   
                                                 
543. Mike Herndon, NCAA Study Finds All but 20 FBS Schools Lose Money on Athletics, AL (Aug. 
20, 2014), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2014/08/ncaa_study_finds_all_but_20_fb.html.  
544. Id. 
545. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 442.  A school can hardly be said to effectively accommodate the 
interests and abilities of its female athletes if it seeks to eliminate a healthy women’s varsity team.  See 
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 904 (1st Cir. 1993). 
546. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 442. 
547. Id. 
548. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 470 (D. Conn. 2013). 
549. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 470 n.63; see also Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 460–61 (observing 
the justified criticism of “institutions that have prematurely applied the label ‘sport’ to an existing  
activity to demonstrate Title IX compliance while avoiding the more costly alternative of adding  
traditional sports”); Hogshead-Makar, supra note 228, at 488 (identifying the deceptive practice of 
“starting new, cheaper teams for women” as a method for attempting to satisfy Title IX requirements); 
Glenn M. Wong et al., NCAA Division I Athletic Directors: An Analysis of the Responsibilities,  
Qualifications and Characteristics, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 45 (2015) (characterizing 
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Accordingly,  
 
rather than simply recommit to women’s volleyball or bring 
other NCAA-championship sports to campus, the University 
doubled down on its plan to eliminate volleyball, and staked its 
compliance with Title IX on an as-yet unrecognized sport as 
well as an emerging sport in imminent danger of losing that 
recognition.550 
 
Indeed, had the court endorsed “the meager level of competition that  
Quinnipiac’s cheer team experienced in 2009–2010, it would have rendered the 
definition of varsity sport dangerously broad.”551  Moreover, while women’s 
rugby unquestionably possessed the intrinsic attributes of a sport, issues 
 regarding its administration and competitive structure still deprived its  
participants of a quality athletic experience on par with the experiences of  
other varsity athletes.552  The risk in allowing universities to “offer women’s 
sports that have minimal competitive structures and call them the equivalent of 
highly organized men’s sports,” is that such “backsliding” would inevitably  
occur.553  Thus, the Biediger decisions provide an important bulwark against the 
temptation of universities to take financial shortcuts toward Title IX  
compliance that would not truly provide their female athletes with genuine  
intercollegiate athletic participation opportunities. 
Of course, it must also be remembered that Biediger did not foreclose the 
possibility of competitive cheerleading or acro one day meeting the  
requirements of a sport for Title IX purposes.  The district court itself had  
 
little doubt that at some point in the near future—once  
competitive cheer is better organized and defined, and surely in 
the event that the NCAA recognizes the activity as an emerging 
sport—competitive cheer will be acknowledged as a bona fide 
sporting activity by academic institutions, the public, and the 
                                                 
Quinnipiac’s actions as “a clever attempt to enlarge the definition of female sports for Title IX  
purposes.”). 
550. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 471. 
551. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 452–53. 
552. See Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 462. 
553. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 453. This is due to the fact that “[c]ollege and university athletic  
departments do not have a history of voluntarily striving for gender equity, partly because it is  
politically and financially difficult to achieve.”  Id. 
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law.554 
 
The Second Circuit echoed these sentiments, refusing to foreclose the  
possibility that competitive cheer, “with better organization and defined rules, 
might some day warrant recognition as a varsity sport.”555  Unfortunately, both 
courts agreed that that day had not yet arrived.556 
Nor has that day likely arrived in the two years since the district court’s 
2013 decision.  To be sure, further improvements to competitive cheer or acro 
have been made.  For one thing, the NCATA national championship  
tournament is no longer an open invitational, as only the top eight teams in the 
country are invited.557  However, the NCATA and USA Cheer still have not 
reconciled their differences and both continue to offer competing formats for 
competitive cheer.  As a result, neither format has yet attained emerging sport 
recognition from the NCAA.558  Moreover, issues regarding the competitive 
quality of Quinnipiac’s schedules remain.  While thirteen schools sponsored 
acro teams for the 2015–2016 season, only three were members of NCAA  
Division I, including Quinnipiac.559  The same issues plague women’s rugby.  
                                                 
554. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 101 (D. Conn. 2010). 
555. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 105 (2d Cir. 2012). 
556. Id.; Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 101. 
557. See NCATA Announces 2015 Championship Field, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ACROBATICS & 
TUMBLING ASS’N (Sept. 30, 2015), http://thencata.org/sports/acro/2014-15/releases/NCATA-
Champ_TournamentField/.  Similarly, the USA Cheer-sponsored STUNT held separate double-elimi-
nation tournaments for Division I and Division II programs, in which the four top ranking teams at each 
level qualified.  See 2015 College STUNT: April Update, USA CHEER, http://usacheer.net/2015col-
legestunt (last visited June 9, 2016); 2015 STUNT Division I National Championship, C. STUNT, 
http://collegestunt.org/2015-season/2015-stunt-national-championship/2015-stunt-division-i-national-
championship (last visited June 9, 2016); 2015 STUNT Division II National Championship, C. STUNT, 
http://collegestunt.org/2015-season/2015-stunt-national-championship/2015-stunt-division-ii-na-
tional-championship (last visited June 9, 2016). 
558. See About, C. STUNT, http://collegestunt.org/about-stunt/ (last visited June 9, 2016) (stating 
that “USA Cheer is working closely with legal and Title IX experts to ensure that STUNT . . . can 
develop into a sport that qualifies for Title IX purposes.”); FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, NAT’L 
COLLEGIATE ACROBATICS & TUMBLING ASS’N (Oct. 5, 2015), http://thencata.org/this_is/FAQ (noting 
that the NCATA’s mission is to attain emerging sport status); Mission & Vision, NAT’L COLLEGIATE 
ACROBATICS & TUMBLING ASS’N (Oct. 5, 2015), http://thencata.org/this_is/missionvision (stating that 
“[t]he mission of the NCATA is to bring the sport . . . to NCAA emerging sport status and towards a 
fully sanctioned NCAA championship sport.”). 
559. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ACROBATICS & TUMBLING ASS’N, http://thencata.org/landing/index (last 
visited June 9, 2016).  Of the remaining schools, seven are members of Division II, two are members 
of Division III, and one is a member of the NAIA.  Id.  USA Cheer, on the other hand, claims that more 
than fifty colleges participated in STUNT over the last five years but did not indicate how many of 
these teams were varsity teams, rather than club teams.  See 2015 College STUNT: November College 
Article, USA CHEER, http://usacheer.net/2015collegestunt (last visited June 9, 2016). 
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Twelve varsity women’s rugby teams are participating in the 2015–2016  
season, but only six, including Quinnipiac, are members of Division I.560 
Thus, despite further improvements, it is unlikely that either competitive 
cheer or women’s rugby would be found to constitute sports for Title IX  
purposes even today.561  Ultimately, however, when the day does arrive that 
competitive cheer and women’s rugby are considered sports under Title IX, the 
concerns underlying the Biediger decisions will provide stronger  
incentives for those in charge of those activities “to work diligently to  
organize, standardize, and increase the competitive opportunities,” resulting, in 
the long run, in improved Title IX compliance and benefits to women’s 
sports.562 
B. Criticisms 
1. Definition of “Sport” Too “Narrow” 
Surprisingly, considering the detail and care with which the Biediger courts 
made their rulings, the decisions have been subject to criticism from several 
commentators.  It has been suggested that the courts’ definition of sport and 
application of the OCR factors was too narrow.  This criticism proceeds along 
two main prongs.  First, critics suggest that the OCR factors, as applied in  
Biediger, fail to “evaluate the athleticism required by an activity in determining 
whether it is a genuine athletic opportunity.”563  They assert that while the OCR 
test focuses on structure, administration, team preparation, and competition, “it 
ignores the requisite skill, strength, and athleticism required of a sport.”564   
Critics fear that the standard, as applied in Biediger, will result in “activities 
                                                 
560. NCAA Women’s Rugby, USA RUGBY, http://usarugby.org/ncaa (last visited June 9, 2016).  
Two NAIA schools are also sponsoring women’s rugby, with an additional eight schools across  
divisions sponsoring club teams.  Id.  
561. Perhaps, however, recognition will be achieved for competitive cheer in the near future.  
“[A]ccording to the National Federation of State High School Associations, approximately 123,000 
[high school] students participated in competitive cheer in 2009.” MITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 814.  
Competitive cheer is “among the fastest growing sports in the country.”  Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 
445; but see MITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 25 (observing that “[p]articipation in competitive cheer 
declined” in 2010–11, “after having experienced significant increases in prior years”).  Moreover, based 
on Quinnipiac’s experiences, it seems that operating costs for competitive cheer and acro are on par 
with other women’s sports, which might prevent universities from simply using it “as a quick fix to 
Title IX compliance on a budget.”  Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 461. 
562. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 454, 464. 
563. Kiersten McKoy, Comment, Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457, 
461 (2014). 
564. Id. at 464. 
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requiring little or no physical exertion” satisfying Title IX requirements, as long 
as they meet the structure, administration, team preparation, and competition 
factors, “while those activities that require just as much, if not more, physical 
exertion than current varsity sports (e.g., competitive cheerleading) will not ful-
fill Title IX requirements.”565  Specifically, the Biediger court is accused of “ig-
noring the athletic nature of the [sic] competitive cheer and the existence of 
competitive events in favor of traditional stereotypes about ‘pom-poms and 
looking pretty.’”566  The critics suggest modifying the OCR test to include an 
athletic component.567 
Contrary to these assertions, no such modification of the test for  
determining which activities count as sports for purposes of Title IX is needed.  
Neither Biediger nor the OCR test ignores the athletic nature of the activity in 
question.  The district court and the Second Circuit in Biediger both  
specifically acknowledged “that competitive cheerleading can be physically 
challenging, requiring competitors to possess ‘strength, agility, and grace.’”568  
However, simply requiring physical exertion and athletic skill is not enough, 
standing alone, to support a finding that an activity constitutes a sport for  
purposes of Title IX—those athletic skills must be utilized in a context  
providing their possessors with genuine intercollegiate-level athletic  
participation opportunities.  Furthermore, the OCR test does account for  
physical exertion and athletic skill, at least indirectly.  If an activity is  
recognized as an emerging sport by the NCAA, it is entitled to a presumption 
that it constitutes a sport for purposes of Title IX.569  The NCAA’s Criteria for 
Emerging Sports defines a sport as “an institutional activity involving physical 
exertion with the purpose of competition versus other teams or individuals 
within a collegiate competition structure,” and which “includes regularly  
scheduled team and/or individual, head-to-head competition (at least five) 
within a defined competitive season(s); and standardized rules with  
rating/scoring systems ratified by official regulatory agencies and governing 
bodies.”570  Thus, if an activity is classified as an emerging sport, which  
                                                 
565. Id. at 464–65. 
566. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 453. 
567. McKoy, supra note 563, at 467–68. 
568. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 105 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Biediger v. Quinnipiac 
Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 101 (D. Conn. 2010)); see also Sowder et al., supra note 181 (identifying 
fitness, endurance, strength, power, agility, and flexibility as physical elements embodied by  
cheerleading). 
569. See Monroe, supra note 14, at 2. 
570. CRITERIA FOR EMERGING SPORTS, supra note 133 (emphasis added); see also Buzuvis, supra 
note 13, at 456–57.  Of course, the emerging sports framework itself is not above criticism.  Some 
commentators have suggested that, in practice, the sports that were approved as emerging sports have 
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accounts for the physical exertion involved in the activity, it will be presumed 
to be a sport for purposes of the OCR test for determining what constitutes a 
sport under Title IX. 
The other prong of the criticism concerns the comparative approach adopted 
by both OCR and the Biediger courts, which “only consider[s] an  
activity to be ‘athletic’ if it is similar to already-existing varsity sports.”571   
Critics believe that “evaluating whether a newly developed activity has similar 
competitive opportunities to existing sports undermines the goal of creating 
equal opportunity because teams engaging in new activities cannot survive this 
rigorous standard.”572  According to this line of reasoning, upon their  
initiation, new activities cannot possibly offer competitive opportunities  
comparable to existing sports that had years to develop, so time to invest  
resources in these activities is needed before they can hope to satisfy the OCR 
test.573  Budgetary restraints, however, may make schools reluctant to invest in 
new activities that are not immediately compliant with Title IX.574  Therefore, 
new activities that meet the administrative factors of the OCR test should  
receive a grace period in which competitive opportunities may grow and  
athletes can still be counted toward Title IX compliance.575 
No such grace period is needed.  Again, this proposal ignores the  
implications of attaining emerging sport status, which would help to assuage 
concerns regarding recognition of new activities.576  Moreover, even if  
emerging sports cannot be counted for purposes of the substantial  
proportionality prong—a conclusion the district court assiduously avoided 
reaching577—that does not mean they are irrelevant for purposes of Title IX.  
The court itself recognized that new activities would “require an incubation  
                                                 
simply constituted the women’s version of an already established men’s sport, rather than a purely 
female-driven activity, and have appealed more to women of a higher socioeconomic status.  See 
MITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 776, 801; Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 462–63. 
571. See Glatt, supra note 12, at 307. 
572. McKoy, supra note 563, at 461. 
573. Id. at 465. 
574. Id. 
575. Id. at 469. 
576. OCR itself has expressly stated that its test is designed “to encourage compliance with the Title 
IX athletics regulations in a flexible manner that expands, rather than limits, student athletic  
opportunities.”  Monroe, supra note 14, at 4 (emphasis omitted).  The factors are designed “to provide 
institutions with information to include new sports in their athletics programs, such as those athletic 
activities not yet recognized by governing athletics organizations and those featured at the Olympic 
games, if they so choose.”  Id. 
577. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 462 (D. Conn. 2013). 
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period in which to grow and develop.”578  The court, therefore, emphasized that 
“it seems all but certain that sponsorship of emerging sports could count toward 
compliance under prongs two or three.”579  Accordingly, the problem in  
Biediger was not the fact that new activities may never be considered in the Title 
IX analysis, but that “Quinnipiac has taken a prong-two approach to  
solving a prong-one problem.”580  Therefore, even if new activities might not 
always be taken into account under the first prong of the three-part test, this is 
only because they are more appropriately considered elsewhere in the Title IX 
analysis. 
2. Deference 
Another area of criticism has been the level of deference the Biediger courts 
accorded to the various OCR pronouncements.  Critics charge that the district 
court erroneously “assumed without analysis that the 2008 Letter  
interpreted a regulation and thereby qualified for [heightened] Martin  
deference.”581  Rather, low-level Skidmore deference should have been  
applied, and the 2008 OCR Letter should have been found unpersuasive.582  
Again, this criticism misses the mark. 
The basis for the assertion that the 2008 OCR Letter is not entitled to  
Martin deference appears to be that the 2008 OCR Letter could not have been 
interpreting ambiguity in the language of any regulation, because the  
applicable regulation under 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) “gives no guidance on the 
word ‘athletic,’ merely calling on universities to provide ‘equal athletic  
opportunity.’”583  To the contrary, the regulation states that whether  
universities provide “equal athletic opportunity” will be determined based on 
“[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively  
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes.”584  What is 
meant by “sports” remains unclear from the regulation, and it was this  
ambiguous language that OCR interpreted in the 2008 OCR Letter, thereby  
                                                 
578. Id. 
579. Id.  Of course, the district court did not need to make such a finding, as Quinnipiac defended 
itself solely on the basis of the substantial proportionality prong.  Id. at 458.   
580. Id. at 471. 
581. Glatt, supra note 12, at 315. 
582. See id. at 315–21. 
583. Id. at 315–16. 
584. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2016). 
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entitling the Letter to heightened Martin deference.585  The Second Circuit sub-
sequently agreed that the OCR Letters were “entitled to substantial  
deference.”586  Moreover, the Second Circuit further held that even if the OCR 
Letters were not entitled to heightened deference, they would still be entitled to 
deference, “because their logical consistency with the . . . Policy  
Interpretation amplifies their ‘power to persuade.’”587  Therefore, the Biediger 
courts properly deferred to the OCR Letters in reaching their determination. 
For all of the above reasons, the criticisms of Biediger fail to withstand 
scrutiny.  The district court’s well-reasoned decision was correct as a matter of 
both law and policy, and its analysis of what constitutes a sport for purposes of 
Title IX, as well as the levels-of-competition test, should be the starting point 
for all subsequent decisions on these subjects. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the recent victory of the United States Women’s National Team in the 
2015 FIFA Women’s World Cup, the impact of Title IX has again been in the 
forefront of the news.  The importance of providing equal athletic opportunities 
to female athletes cannot be understated.  However, those athletic opportunities 
must be genuine and come within the context of a “sport.”  The Biediger  
decisions mark the first time that federal courts had the occasion to consider 
what constitutes a sport for purposes of compliance with Title IX.  Biediger also 
represents the first instance in which a federal court interpreted and applied Title 
IX’s levels-of-competition test.  As illustrated in this Article, the thorough and 
complete analyses embodied by the Biediger decisions represent an appropriate 
balancing of the relevant factors set forth by OCR.  Both the district court and 
the Second Circuit properly recognized that adopting too broad a definition of 
sport risked watering down women’s sports.  The Biediger trilogy therefore  
provides an important bulwark against the temptation of universities to take 
shortcuts to achieve Title IX compliance when faced with budgetary constraints.  
Going forward, the Biediger decisions will help ensure that female athletes  
receive genuine intercollegiate-level athletic participation opportunities. 
 
 
                                                 
585. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 92–93 (D. Conn. 2010); Monroe, supra 
note 14, at 1–2. 
586. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2012).  At least one other federal 
court has accorded a similar degree of deference to a Dear Colleague Letter, citing the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Biediger.  See T.E. v. Pine Bush Cent. Sch. Dist., 58 F. Supp. 3d 332, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
587. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 97 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 
2169 (2012)). 
